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The conventional wisdom was that the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), would benefit large banks over small
sized banks, magnifying the claim that banks were “Too Big to Fail”. In my first
chapter, I examine whether investors react differently to important news regarding
the CPP, depending on the asset size of banks. Using returns to common stock share-
holders, I analyze the CPP announcement, bank capital infusions, and repayments
and find that large banks, regardless of whether or not they entered into the CPP
program and received capital, had large and significant returns at the time of the
program’s announcement (approximately 10% and 7%, respectively). Compared to
returns for investors of small banks, investors of large banks received a 7.5% higher
return, indicating that investors of large banks initially thought that the TARP-
CPP disproportionately helped larger banks. This “Too Big to Fail” reaction is also
prevalent when examining systematic risk (market risk), as the betas of large banks
increased the year after banks received CPP capital, indicating that the capital was
not enough to cover possible capital shortfalls or the loaned government capital would
lead banks to be riskier in the future.
My second chapter investigates the empirical relationship between a bank’s in-
volvement in various nontraditional activities and the likelihood that a bank fails or
receives TARP capital. Using a probit analysis, I estimate that banks are more likely
to receive TARP capital if they have lower tier one capital ratios, lower ROAs, more
real estate loans, more standby letters of credit and commercial letters of credit. My
probit estimates of bank failure from 2007-2011 also suggest that these balance sheet
variables and off balance sheet variables affect bank failures similarly. Previous stud-
ies that independently analyze bank failure or entry into TARP only include balance
ii
sheet variables. However, due to the increasing amount of securitized assets used for
collateral during the financial crisis coupled with the increasing amount of bank fail-
ures and government bank bailouts, it is imperative to account for off balance sheet
items in assessing the determinants of bank failures and bank bailouts in the probit
analysis. The striking similarity in probit estimates for entry into TARP and bank
failure suggest that TARP may have helped banks that otherwise would have failed.
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1 Does Bank Size Matter? Investor Reactions to
TARP
1.1 Introduction
During the financial crisis from 2007-2009, banks were in need of capital due to an
increasing amount of foreclosures on mortgages and derivatives tied to mortgages.1
To recapitalize banks and revitalize lending markets, the U.S. government created
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) which assisted not only banks, but also
mortgage lenders, automobile companies, and insurance companies. The Capital
Purchase Program (CPP) was the largest of TARP’s six bank programs and loaned
approximately $205 billion to 707 financial institutions.2 The CPP was designed to
“bolster the capital position of viable institutions of all sizes and to build confidence
in these institutions and the financial system as a whole” (U.S. Treasury). Although
the CPP provided more capital to banks, government commitment of public funds
caused many American citizens to be concerned about moral hazard. Moral hazard,
as Wheelock (2012) describes, is created by treating a bank as “Too Big to Fail”
and extending unlimited protection to depositors and creditors, giving a bank not
only a funding advantage, but an incentive to take on more risk.3 In this paper I
examine whether investors react differently to key CPP events, depending on the
asset size of banks, to determine whether investors viewed the CPP as a program
1The number of foreclosure filings in 2005 was just under one million. In 2007 there were 2,203,295
filings, which increased to 3,957,643 filings by the beginning of 2009.
2This is approximately 83% of the total amount of TARP disbursements to financial institutions
through five distinct bank programs and 37% of the total TARP disbursements.
3Too Big To Fail is a concern that still remains. An article published, February 24, 2014 states,
“We shouldn’t be surprised that markets continue to doubt that these institutions’ investors and
counterparties will be fully accountable for their losses. To make matters worse, market doubts
can lead to funding advantages that encourage the biggest financial companies to get even bigger
– and the industry even more concentrated. In this way, too big to fail can become self-fulfilling.”
(Millstein and Delfin, 2014).
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that disproportionately helped larger banks.
Using an event study analysis, I find that in the five days surrounding the CPP
announcement there is a 6% abnormal return for banks participating in the CPP com-
pared to a 1.8% abnormal return for banks that did not participate in the CPP. 4 This
result is magnified when looking at the abnormal returns of large banks that entered
the CPP program and large banks that did not. Large banks that participated in the
CPP had an abnormal return of 10.17% at the program’s announcement compared
to 7.61% for large banks that did not participate. Small banks that participated in
the CPP had only a 1.59% abnormal return. Additionally, this paper tests whether
one type of risk, systematic risk, changes after the CPP and whether systematic risk
changes differentially depending on the size of the bank. I find that systematic risk
increases in the year after banks receive CPP capital for large banks, but decreases in
small banks. This result indicates that investors may have believed the loaned CPP
capital would lead banks to make riskier investments.
Event study analysis on the CPP is not new. Elyasiani et al. (2014) and Farruggio
et al. (2013) examine abnormal returns and systematic risk changes to the TARP
announcement and find similar results to my analysis. However, my paper is the first
to examine whether investor reactions to the CPP are different, depending on the asset
size of banks. Estimating the differences between small and large bank performance
has been researched with mixed results. Godbillon-Camus and Godlewski (2006)
show that small banks can better manage risk compared to large banks, whereas
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) show that small banks are more efficient prior to the
1980s deregulation period, but after deregulation small and large banks are equally
efficient. Bertay et al. (2012) examine the difference between small and large bank
performance and show that as banks get bigger in size, the increased risk outweighs the
4Abnormal returns are calculated by estimating predicted returns less actual returns.
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return on assets. My research contributes to both the CPP event study and bank size
literature. Understanding how investors reacted to the CPP can help confirm whether
or not the CPP was thought to only help large banks. Also, investor reactions to the
CPP can give insight as to whether systematic risk changes over time relative to the
asset size of banks.
1.2 Background on the TARP-CPP program
In early 2008, mortgage foreclosures were increasing, housing prices were falling
and banks involved in securitization, credit derivative swaps and subprime mortgages
found it more difficult to obtain credit. Further, due to contagion effects, banks that
were not involved with mortgage-related financial products also found it increasingly
difficult to obtain credit.5 In an effort to stabilize the economy and provide needed
credit to the market, President Bush signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act on October 3, 2008, which authorized the Department of Treasury to buy $700
billion in troubled assets. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was designed
to provide capital to the financial sector specifically for “residential or commercial
mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or
related to such mortgages” (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008).
The TARP is composed of six programs designed to stabilize the financial sector.
The largest, and perhaps most significant, program was the Capital Purchase Program
which loaned capital directly to financial institutions. In exchange for the capital
5 As housing failures were increasing, many banks were in need of capital, but it was difficult to
find banks willing to lend. In the months prior to TARP’s announcement, Bear Stearns, Countrywide
Financial Corporation, IndyMac Bank, Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual failed, while
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into government conservationship. Conservationship is
the legal process for entities that are not eligible for bankruptcy proceedings; it establishes control
and oversight of the company (St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank). Therefore, banks that had extra
capital may have been reluctant to lend due to the increasing amount of bank failures and assisted
mergers.
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infusions, the Treasury received preferred stock that paid quarterly dividends of 5%
for the first five years and 9% thereafter until the loans were paid back. The Treasury
also received warrants to purchase common shares while banks still held CPP capital
to “enable taxpayers to reap additional returns on their investments” (U.S. Treasury).
Capital was infused to 707 institutions in 48 states. Of these, 25 banks received over
$1 billion in TARP funding, 56 banks received over $100 million to $1 billion in
TARP funding, 610 banks received between $1 million and $100 million and 15 banks
received between $301,000 and $1 million. Banks with the largest capital injections
received the most media attention, but TARP intervened in banks of all sizes.6 The
TARP-CPP was designed by the Treasury to address capital issues in banks, while the
Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds target rate during the 2007-2009 financial
crisis and created new programs to address any liquidity concerns for banks. A
timeline indicating key financial crisis events, such as new U.S. Treasury or Federal
Reserve programs, can be found in the Appendix.
Additionally, a snapshot of the uncertainty in the economy during 2007-2009 is
graphed in Figure 1.1. The uncertainty index is a measure that takes into account the
number of times the top 10 U.S. newspapers discuss economic uncertainty, tax code
expirations, and forecaster disagreement about inflation.7 The solid, black line repre-
sents the spread between financial commercial paper and T-bills. Commercial paper
is a short-term debt instrument that is not backed by collateral, so only high-quality
banks will issue this debt. Examining Figure 1.1 shows that the spread between what
6Citigroup Inc., Bank of American Corporation, J.P. Morgan Chase & Company and Wells Fargo
& Company had the largest bailout of $25 billion each, while The Freeport State Bank in Harper,
Kansas had the lowest bailout of $301,000.
7Tax code expirations set to expire in the next few years are “a source of uncertainty because
Congress often waits till the last hour before deciding whether to extend them, undermining stability”
(Baker al. 2013). Further, forecaster disagreement represents the dispersion of individual forecasts
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. Forecaster
disagreement proxies for uncertainty.
4
would be considered a safe, private market debt instrument, commercial paper, and
the spread between the risk-free government asset, Treasury Bills, is widening before
the CPP announcement. At the end of 2007, this spread hits almost 2%, however after
the CPP announcement the spread between commercial paper and T-bills decreases,
mostly due to investors finding commercial paper to be a safer debt instrument. The
uncertainty index shows that uncertainty in the economy peaked right at the time
of the CPP announcement, but slowly falls after the CPP announcement, indicating
that CPP provided some certainty to financial markets.
1.3 Related Studies on the CPP and TARP
A handful of event studies examine investor reactions to TARP related events.
Farruggio et al. (2013) empirically look at the first announcement of TARP and find
that announcements and capital repayments promote positive wealth effects and a
decrease in bank risk. They examine systematic risk, systemic risk and idiosyncratic
risk of banks and find that systemic risk, or the financial industry risk, increases as a
result of the TARP announcement and capital infusions.8 I examine one type of risk,
systematic risk, after the CPP based on the asset size of banks. I do not estimate
systemic risk, because, as Wheelock (2012) points out, systemic risk is mitigated when
the government treats large banks as “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) and commits public
funds to ensure payment of large bank debts. TBTF, however, creates moral hazard.
Therefore, measuring systematic risk allows me to understand how the aggregate risk
from the market changes as a result of government policy.
A second event study that relates to my research examines large seasoned eq-
8Idiosyncratic risk is individual bank risk, systematic risk is non-diversifiable risk or market risk,
and systemic risk is risk inherent to the financial industry as a whole.
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uity offerings (SEOs) by U.S. financial institutions from 2000 to 2009 and compares
investor reactions to TARP capital injections. Elyasiani al. (2014) find that over
2000-2009, investors negatively react to the news of private market SEOs by finan-
cial institutions, but positively to TARP injections.9 Alternatively, King (2009) uses
credit default swap spreads and stock prices for 52 large, international and national
banks and finds that the U.S. rescue package created larger positive stock returns
for banks within a fifty day window compared to European rescue packages. This
result is not surprising considering Veronesi and Zingales (2010) estimated that the
first banks that took TARP money had an increase in enterprise value of $131 billion
immediately after the announcement.10
Additional studies also examine how different measures of risk change after TARP.
Nijskens and Wagner (2011) examine credit default swaps and collateralized loan
obligations and find that systematic risk increases, represented by beta. Duchin
and Sosyura (2012) find that after receiving TARP capital, banks increased credit
issuance to riskier firms.11 Coffey et al. (2009) find that covered interest rate par-
ity deviations,12 decreased after the TARP announcement indicating that arbitrage
transactions in international capital markets decreased due to less counterparty credit
risk. Black and Hazelwood(2012) find that average risk of loan originations increased
for large TARP banks relative to non-TARP banks through 2009, while small TARP
banks decreased average risk relative to non-TARP banks. Their results mirror my
9They also find that firms with more leverage received capital via TARP, but their capital ade-
quacy did not increase after TARP injections due to increased lending activity after receiving TARP
funds. Elyasiani et al. further breaks down risk into alternative categories and they find that TARP
banks had an increase in credit risk, but no increase in liquidity risk.
10Enterprise value for banks is found by looking at the change in the value of liquid credit default
swap (CDS) rates minus the change in the CDS rates of GE Capital plus abnormal variation in
market value of common equity, preferred equity, derivative liabilities and reduction in FDIC deposit
guarantee.
11They measure borrowers’ cash flow volatility, interest coverage and asset tangibility to determine
the riskiness of firms.
12When a forward contract is used to cover exchange rate risk.
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own as they examine banks based on asset size and find similar changes in the riskiness
of banks13
Although I do not model the decision for the Treasury to accept banks into the
CPP, several studies investigate which banks received TARP infusions and find that
larger, riskier and more politically connected banks were more likely to receive fund-
ing. First, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) look at the bank applications for the
CPP program and find that larger banks and those with more systemic risk were
approved for the TARP injections.14 Additionally, they find that banks that applied
for, but declined the CPP funds, typically were strong banks, as measured by capital
ratios and asset quality. They posit that banks that found the new executive com-
pensation regulations, which were passed by Congress in early 2009, too restrictive
exited the CPP earlier. These results are consistent with the spike in capital repay-
ments in early 2009 in Figure 1.3. Figure 1.3 shows how much TARP-CPP was paid
back from 2009-2013. The largest amount paid back occurred in early 2009, around
the same time Congress set new executive compensation regulations.15 Duchin and
Sosyura (2012) find that “politically connected” firms, which are defined as firms
who have “directors [that] hold current or former positions at the Treasury, the firms
banking regulator, or Congress,” were more likely than banks without connections
to be accepted for TARP funding. Politically connected firms underperformed banks
with unconnected counterparts after controlling for firm size, financial conditions, and
other factors declared by regulators as CPP decision criteria.16
13The large TARP bank group in their sample includes 15 banks compared to 10 large non-TARP
banks. Overall, their sample size is 81 banks, compared to 438 for my analysis. This is due to their
usage of the Survey of Terms and Business Lending which stratifies a sample of commercial banks.
Therefore, my sample size is larger, but still yield similar results.
14They define systemic risk to be bank size and outstanding derivative contracts which measure
the potential magnitude of counterparty risk that a bank might impose on the financial system.
15It is also noted that the first round of stress testing was completed in early 2009. Satisfactory
results allowed banks the ability to pay back TARP capital.




My paper uses the event study framework to examine whether there are differences
in abnormal returns and systematic risk, based on a bank’s asset size. Further, I use
sample selection techniques to correct for any sample bias that may occur due to
larger banks participating in the CPP. The three main questions my research seeks
to answer are:
1. Are there different effects in investor reactions to the CPP depending on the
asset size of banks?
2. Does government loaned capital make banks even riskier than before?
3. Do large TARP banks get riskier than small banks?
1.4.2 Event Study Estimation
I use a market model to examine investor reactions related to the TARP announce-
ment, capital infusions and capital repayments, which measures the expected return
on an asset, or a portfolio of assets, relative to a market index. The simple market
model is:
E(Rit) : R̂it = α̂i + β̂i(E(Rmt)) (1.1)
AR = Rit − E(Rit) (1.2)
increased your chances of getting accepted for TARP funds by 7.7%. Duchin and Sosyura also
exclude the nation’s biggest banks because the eight biggest TARP-CPP funds were given to banks












E(Rit) = The expected return of asset i
E(Rmt) = The expected return of the market portfolio
αi = The model’s intercept (a measure of risk-adjusted daily performance)
βi = cov(Ri, Rm)/var(Rm)
AR= abnormal return
CAAR= cumulative average abnormal return
The market model shows that the expected return on a security is equal to βi times
the expected return on a market portfolio plus a risk-adjusted “excess” performance
measure. βi can be interpreted as the amount of non-diversifiable risk inherent in
the security relative to the risk of the market portfolio.17 αi should be equal to zero
in an efficient market, because there should be no “excess” return for the risk born
by the investor. αi < 0 if the investment returned less than the risk born by the
investor and αi > 0 occurs when the investment returned more than the risk born by
the investor.18
Equation (1.1) is estimated by using real returns on the S&P 500 market index
and bank common stock data. Abnormal returns, are found by estimating over a
pre-event window period and subtracting the predicted return value from the actual
17In general, investors face two kinds of risks, diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk. Non-
diversifiable risk is also called systematic risk. Diversifiable risk can be eliminated by increasing
the size of the portfolio and variations in asset investments, whereas systematic risk is associated
with movements in the general market. This can also be called market risk and this cannot be
eliminated through portfolio diversification.
18Refer to Jensen’s alpha in Jensen(1968). In the Appendix, I alternatively use the capital asset
pricing model and report tables using that specification.
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return in Equation 1.2.19 A pre-event window, or control period, allows for a com-
parison of common equity volatility in the year preceding the event to determine
the abnormality of returns during the event. Specifically, I estimate returns over a
250 day pre-event and post-event window20 and use five-days surrounding an event
to calculate cumulative abnormal returns.21 Therefore, abnormal returns are calcu-






t=T1ARit. Where t=T1 to T2 is the five-day event window
surrounding CPP event.
If investors view the CPP announcement, infusion or capital repayment positively,
perhaps because the banking sector is more capitalized, then abnormal returns will
be higher for all banks surrounding the event. If investors think that the CPP will
only benefit large banks and not the entire banking sector, than investors of large
banks will react positively, but investors of small banks may see no abnormal returns
or small abnormal returns. Additionally, there may be differential effects not only
between banks of different asset sizes, but also between banks that participated in
the CPP and banks that did not.
After identifying the pre-event window, the event window and post-event window
I can calculate abnormal returns and identify systematic risk. However, to examine
systematic risk over time, I expand the model in Equation (1.1) to account for changes
in αi and βi surrounding the CPP event (the event window) and in the post-event
19All returns are logged which is standard in the literature and also used in another TARP event-
study by Farruggio et al. (2013). Logging returns is acceptable because they are time additive, also
called time consistent.
20There are 250 trading days in a year.
21Event study pre-estimation periods vary in the literature from 90 days (-3 days prior to an
event to -93 days) and even 120 days. Event window periods can also be reported differently by
either using cumulative abnormal returns in the (-1,1), (-1,0) and (0,+1) periods. Post-event window
periods vary between 250 and 120 days or up to 5 years if it is a long-run event study. Elyasiani et
al. (2014) use a 250 day pre- and post- event window, while Farruggio et al. (2013) use a 120 day
pre- and post-event window on their event study analysis related to TARP. Representing the data
with different event and pre-estimation windows does not drastically change my results.
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window (the year after the CPP event). βi is unlikely to stay constant over a two
year period, so estimating the change in βi can indicate whether systematic risk is
increasing or decreasing. For example, if βi increases over the post-event period
then the non-diversifiable risk inherent in the security is increasing relative to the
market portfolio after the CPP event, perhaps indicating that the CPP capital was
not enough to cover capital shortfalls or loaned government capital may lead banks
to be riskier in the future. The augmented Markowitz model has varying systematic
risk and excess performance components:
Rit = αi0 + βi0Rmt + αi1Eventit + βi1(Rmt · Eventit) (1.4)
+αi2PostEventit + βi2(Rmt · PostEventit) + εit
where,
Rit = Return on day t on the i-th bank’s common stock
Rmt = Return on day t on the “market”, i.e. the systematic risk factor, measured
by the S&P 500 index
Eventit= a dummy variable equal to 1 for all trading days [-2, +2] within the event
window
PostEventit= a dummy variable equal to 1 for all trading days [+3, +253] after the
event window
αi0 = measure of “excess performance”
βi0 = measure of non-diversifiable risk, or systematic risk
αi1 = change in alpha during the event window
βi1 = change in systematic risk during the event window
αi2 = change in alpha pre-event to post-event
βi2 = change in systematic risk pre-event to post-event
11
εit = a disturbance term with a zero mean
In this augmented market model, βi0 represents the systematic risk inherent in
a bank in the year prior to the CPP event. βi1 represents the change in systematic
risk during the event window, while βi2 represents the change in systematic risk from
the pre-event period (the year prior to the event) to the post event period (the year
after the event). If bank investors view the CPP announcement, capital infusion
or capital repayment events positively, because a bank could apply for capital or is
better capitalized, than post-event alpha values would rise and post-event beta values
would decrease. In other words, “excess performance” would increase after a CPP
event and market risk would decrease. On the other hand, if bank investors view
the CPP events negatively because their bank is undercapitalized, and still needs
government capital, then excess performance measures (post-event alpha, αi2) would
fall and systematic risk (post-event beta, βi2) would rise.
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1.5 Data collected for the Event Study
The original dataset was collected from the U.S. Treasury Department TARP
Transaction Report on December 27, 2013. The report included 737 capital infusions
to 707 banks and included variables such as original investment amount, original
investment type, outstanding investment, total cash back, capital repayment dates
and any warrant proceedings. Bank capital infusions occurred between October 28,
2008 and December 29, 2009; whereas, TARP was officially announced on October
14, 2008. The timing of capital infusions to banks is graphed in Figure 1.2. The
largest amount of capital was given out in October 2008 to the nation’s largest banks.
The eight biggest banks by asset size received over half the amount of money that
was allotted to the program. The cumulated volume of capital infusions to banks
22A similar model appears in Elyasiani et al. (2014).
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in my sample is $193 billion which is approximately 94% of the total amount of
capital assistance under the TARP Capital Purchase Program ($204,894,726,320).
The volume of capital repayments totals to $187 billion or approximately 97% of the
total amount of capital assistance to banks in my sample. To date not all of the
TARP funds have been paid back.23
Since my research examines investor reactions to the TARP-CPP, I used stock
price data for each bank, which I collected from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). Additionally, I obtained data on the Fama-French factors from Ken-
neth French’s data library and any bank characteristic data from the Uniform Bank
Performance Report. The S&P 500 is the benchmark index that I use to estimate
market returns, but I have crosschecked my results using the CRSP value-weighted
index, NASDAQ, NYSE Composite 100, and DJIA. The results are consistent re-
gardless of the market index used.24 Despite the allocation of CPP capital to 707
banks, I only include banks that have common stock data. After dropping banks
that are not publically traded, I am left with 219 banks that received CPP capital.
As a comparison group, I construct a random sample of publically traded banks that
do not receive TARP capital. My non-TARP sample includes 219 banks.
Means of key variables are represented in Table 1.1 for banks that entered into the
TARP-CPP and the comparison banks that did not participate in the TARP-CPP.
All numbers are in millions and from quarter 3 2008, which is the quarter before
the TARP-CPP announcement. Specifically, quarter 3 2008 data was reported on
September 30, 2008, two weeks before the CPP was announced. I also partition
banks into three classifications: large, mid-size and small based upon their asset size.
23As of September 10, 2014 the outstanding TARP-CPP loan amount was $633,688,601.88.
24I also report estimates using the CRSP value-weighted index in the Appendix. Farruggio et al.
(2013) use the S&P 500 market index, while Elyasiani et al. (2014) use the CRSP value-weighted
index. These estimates are similar to the estimates found using the S&P 500.
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A bank is classified to be a large bank if assets exceed $3 billion, mid-size if assets are
equal to or between $1 billion and $3 billion and small if assets are less than $1 billion.
This results in 111 banks being classified as large banks–74 banks which received CPP
capital compared to only 37 large banks that did not receive CPP capital. There are
65 mid-size banks that received CPP capital and 62 banks that did not. Only 72
small banks received CPP capital, compared to 120 banks that did not receive CPP
capital.
Banks that receive CPP capital have greater total assets than banks that did
not enter into the TARP-CPP. The required eight banks are the eight banks who
were required to take TARP money: Citigroup, State Street, Bank of America, J.P.
Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of New
York.25 These 8 banks had on average $517 billion in total assets in quarter 3,
compared to $20 billion for other large banks and only $708 million for small banks
that received CPP capital. I excluded the required eight banks from the “large” bank
sample, because they were required to take TARP money, whereas other banks had to
apply. Therefore, these banks should not be treated the same. For large banks that
did not receive CPP capital, total assets on average were $45 billion. However, if I
included the required eight banks in the large TARP bank sample this would increase
average asset size of large banks that received TARP-CPP money to $94 billion.
I also report additional bank characteristics that I will use in Table 1.4 to ad-
dress the issue of sample selection. I include non-performing loans to total loans,
where non-performing loans are loans that are 90 days past due. Long-term debt
to total assets, as well as return on assets which is a ratio of net income to assets
25Merrill Lynch was included in the original meetings on October 13 regarding the TARP program.
However, I do not count Merrill Lynch as a separate company because I do not observe them having
an independent stock ticker throughout the entire sample due to their merger with Bank of America
shortly after the CPP announcement on October 14, 2008.
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are also included. Credit exposure on the off-balance sheet examines current credit
exposure across all off-balance sheet contracts covered by the risk-based capital stan-
dards divided by Tier 1 capital. Tier 1 capital includes equity capital and sometimes
non-cumulative preferred stock. This ratio can measure a bank’s financial strength
considering mortgage-backed securities and many derivative products were put on the
off-balance sheet of banks during the financial crisis. Lastly, the liquidity ratio is the
ratio of cash over total assets.
Two of the largest differences between bank characteristics in Table 1.1 are seen
through my ratio of long term debt to total assets and credit exposure on the off-
balance sheet to Tier 1 capital. The required eight banks and large banks have more
long term debt to total assets than small banks. The required eight banks have a
ratio of 13.64, large TARP banks have a ratio of 7.39 and large non-TARP banks
have a ratio of 3.46. Therefore, this ratio is larger for large TARP banks compared
to non-TARP large banks. TARP banks represent banks that received CPP capital
and non-TARP banks indicate banks that did not receive CPP capital. Small banks’
long term debt ratios were 1.25 for TARP banks and 0.71 for non-TARP banks.
Similarly, there is greater credit exposure on the off-balance sheet relative to Tier 1
capital for the 8 banks that were required to take CPP capital. This ratio is 0.66
for the required eight banks, compared to 0.06 for large TARP banks and 0.04 for
large non-TARP banks. A particularly interesting bank characteristic is the liquidity
ratio on the required eight bank sample compared to all other bank size groups. The
eight required banks had a higher average liquidity ratio while other bank groupings
held a ratio of cash to total assets of 0.02. Since it does not appear that banks
received TARP-CPP capital based on the liquidity ratio of banks, this indicates that
the Treasury’s TARP programs were looking to address capital issues, not liquidity





Cumulative average abnormal return results are reported for all three CPP events





t=T1ARit and AR= Rit − E(Rit). In
the first column, I report the results using the Newey-West model, which corrects
for possible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity between stock returns, and find
that large banks that received CPP capital have an abnormal return of about 15%
during the CPP announcement compared to a 2% abnormal return for small TARP
banks. Large banks that did not receive CPP capital realized a return of about
11% indicating that investors of large banks may have believed that the CPP would
better capitalize the banking industry. There are also positive abnormal returns to
investors of mid-size banks, regardless of whether the bank would eventually receive
CPP capital. However, small banks that did not receive CPP capital realized a slight
negative return.
Correcting for serial correlation is not universal in event study literature, but the
presence of serial correlation would invalidate standard hypothesis tests and interval
estimates in OLS. Therefore, I test for serial correlation using the Durbin-Watson
statistic and the Ljung-Box test for white noise. I find that I cannot reject the
null of no autocorrelation of one-lag.27 The Newey-West model corrects for both
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and allows for changes in variance over time.
Using OLS assumes that the error term has constant variance, but with time series
26A timeline of important Federal Reserve events is in the Appendix.
27The Durbin-Watson test considers the possibility of autoregressive one-lag errors, whereas the
Ljung-Box test examines whether the errors are “white noise” or autocorrelated. The results of
these tests are reported in the Appendix.
16
variables, the error term is likely to vary with increased observations. Not correcting
for heteroskedasticity would not bias my estimates in an OLS regression, but can bias
the standard errors and therefore inferences from the data.28
In addition to the Newey-West specification, I report a second specification which
includes the Fama-French factors. Fama and French (1995) found that the cross-
sectional variation in average security returns is better explained by examining more
than a market beta, so I also estimate abnormal returns by controlling for the
Fama and French non-market risk factors, small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-
low(HML). SMB is the the difference between the return on a portfolio of small
stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks. HML is the difference between
the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfo-
lio of low-book-to-market stocks. Specification (2) uses the Newey-West model but
includes the SMB and HML Fama-French factors.
Examining the results from specification (2) in Table 1.2A, I find that banks that
received TARP-CPP capital have a higher abnormal return during the announcement
of 6.01% in the five-day window compared to 1.82% for banks that did not enter into
the TARP-CPP. Investor reactions differ depending on whether they were invested
in a large, mid-size or small bank. Investors of the required eight banks received an
abnormal return of 10.67% in the five-days surrounding the announcement compared
to 10.17% return for other large banks, 5.60% abnormal return for mid-size banks and
1.59% abnormal return for small banks that would later receive CPP capital. Large
banks that did not participate in the CPP saw a 7.61% abnormal return and investors
of mid-size banks that did not receive CPP capital had a 4.87%. Investors of banks
that did not enter into TARP-CPP may have saw the TARP-CPP announcement on
October 14, 2008 as a positive signal that the overall banking industry will be better
28Elyasiani et al. (2014) also use this estimator in their TARP-event study.
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capitalized. Alternatively, these investors may have also thought that their banks
would eventually enter into the TARP-CPP program.
However, at the time of the announcement, investors were not aware of which
banks would receive CPP capital except the nations nine largest banks. The TARP-
CPP was announced by the U.S. Treasury Department on October 14, 2008. In the
announcement, it was mentioned that the nine largest banks intended to take $125
billion in emergency capital injections, but at the time, the U.S. Treasury Department
made no distinction as to which banks they were. This announcement came after
the “secret” meeting29 on October 13, 2008 at 3:00 p.m. where nine of the biggest
banks’ CEOs, Hank Pauslon, Ben Bernanke, Sheila Bair and Timothy Geithner met to
discuss the mandatory issuance of TARP funding. These banks were chosen because
regulators believed it was imperative to include the country’s largest banks to bolster
confidence in the banking sector.30 After the announcement of the CPP, other banks
were allowed to apply for money31 so at the time, investors did not fully know which
banks would be receiving money. Interestingly, investors of small banks that did not
eventually receive CPP capital received a small, negative abnormal return surrounding
the CPP announcement. Investors may have believed that the CPP would only aid
big banks or that it may have put small banks at a disadvantage.
The announcement date is the only date that is similar across all banks regardless
of size or whether a bank received TARP or not. Since banks that did not participate
in the TARP-CPP are not observed being infused with CPP capital by the U.S.
Treasury, I assign a random capital infusion and capital repayment date to each
non-TARP-CPP bank to allow for comparison across TARP banks and non-TARP
29Details of this meeting were openly discussed weeks after.
30None of these banks were, at that time, subjected to a formal evaluation.
31The complete Treasury Press release on the CPP announcement is included in the Appendix.
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banks.32 Figure 1.2 shows the amount of money, in millions, that banks received
over the capital infusion period from 2008-2009. The eight required banks received
over half of the capital for the program and they received the capital mostly in
October 2008. When examining abnormal returns surrounding the capital infusion
in Table 1.2B, all banks experience a negative cumulative abnormal return. A bank
that received TARP-CPP capital may have a negative return surrounding the capital
infusion, for example, if investors thought the bank was sound and did not need extra
capital.33
Banks that received TARP-CPP capital had a cumulative abnormal return of
approximately -2.45% based on the Newey-West Fama-French factor model compared
to a -1.98% return for non-participating banks. More interestingly, the required
eight banks had a negative cumulative abnormal return of -7.10%, while the other
large TARP banks had a cumulative abnormal return of -7.62% compared to only
-3.38% for small TARP banks. Large banks that did not receive CPP capital only
saw a -4.27% abnormal return. Investors of banks that received CPP capital either
reacted negatively to the capital infusion event because the government received senior
preferred shares, ranking the government shares above senior and common stock in
bankruptcy proceedings,34 or because the bank has capital issues and they needed
U.S. Treasury loans.
Investors reacted to the repayment of CPP capital with a 1.75% abnormal return
for the eight banks that were required to take TARP, a 0.73% abnormal return for
large banks that received CPP capital and a 3.52% abnormal return for small banks
32A non-TARP bank is randomly assigned a date for CPP capital infusion based upon the range
of dates that TARP banks received money. A similar process is used to assign a capital repayment
date.
33Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, has often claimed, JP Morgan Chase never needed the
money, but was asked to take it for the sake of weaker banks (Dealbook, 2009). The negative return
surrounding JP Morgan Chase’s capital infusion on October 28, 2008 supports this hypothesis.
34Further, these shares came with a hefty dividend.
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that received CPP capital.35 Figure 1.3 records when banks repaid back capital from
2009 to the end of 2013. Early in 2009, there were restrictions put on bank CEO
pay for banks that received TARP capital, so the large jump in capital repayment in
June 2009 corresponds to Congressional action and the first time banks were allowed
to pay back capital after passing stress tests. Therefore, investors may have reacted
positively to the capital repayment for the eight required banks, because they were
less likely to lose their management team to compensation restrictions. Interestingly,
the larger cumulative average abnormal returns during this event window are for small
sized banks that paid back TARP-CPP capital. Investors of banks that did enter into
the TARP-CPP may have seen the TARP-CPP repayment as a positive signal that
the bank is better capitalized. Further, investors no longer had to come second to
the government in bankruptcy proceedings and the high dividend payments to the
government would cease. However, the only significant result is that all TARP banks
received a 1.83% abnormal return at the CPP capital repayment and mid-sized CPP
banks had a 1.42% abnormal return.36
1.6.2 How Market Risk Changes the Year After TARP-CPP Events
The market model in Equation (1.2) is estimated and the results are reported in
Table 1.3A-C for banks that participated in the TARP-CPP and banks that did not.
Excess return, or performance, for investors of banks that entered into the CPP and
banks that did not participate are similar before and after all three events. However,
during the five day event window surrounding the CPP announcement investors of
35Other CPP event studies such as Elyasiani et al. (2014) and Farruggio et al. (2013) do not
examine the CPP capital repayment due to data unavailability.
36This is likely due to the fact that many banks divided their capital repayments into multiple,
smaller payments. To avoid examining the same bank twice over a similar range of data, I only
examine the first time a bank repaid capital back to the government. Additionally, some banks
received more than one capital infusion, but in no more than two segments. I also examined only
the first capital infusion.
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large TARP banks saw a higher change in excess return, αi1, of 0.0248 compared to a
change in excess return of 0.0011 for small TARP banks. Further, there is a positive
excess return in the five-days surrounding the CPP announcement for all banks except
small banks that did not participate in the CPP program. αi should be equal to zero
in an efficient market, because there should be no “excess” return for the risk born by
the investor. So, a positive αi1 indicates that there is additional return to an investor
relative to the risk that is inherent in the stock. Investors of large banks, regardless of
whether these banks received CPP capital or not, saw higher excess returns compared
to small banks. αi0 represents the “excess performance” of a stock in the year before
the event, αi1 represents the change in “excess performance” during the five-day event
window and αi2 shows the change in alpha pre-event to post-event.
However, during the event window surrounding the infusion of CPP capital into
banks in Table 1.3B, investors of all banks had a negative excess return. During
the event window for TARP banks, αi1 was -0.46% compared to -0.34% for banks
that did not receive CPP capital. These investor reactions show that investors were
not receiving a return that was sufficient for the risk they were bearing. Investors
may have believed their bank was well-capitalized and now there is a risk of pos-
sible bankruptcy or that the government could influence bank operations now with
preferred stock. Table 1.3C shows small and non-significant excess return for banks
during the capital repayment.
Systematic risk, or market risk, before the CPP announcement was higher for
banks that entered into the CPP than for banks that did not participate in the CPP.
This result can be seen in Table 1.3A when looking at βi0 and is driven by large TARP
banks. βi0 represents the systematic risk in the year before the event, βi1 represents
the change in systematic risk during the five-day event window, βi2 shows the change
in beta pre-event to post-event. Since the market has a normalized risk of 1.0, if a
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stock has a risk greater than 1.0, as measured by beta, it has more price volatility
than the overall market and is hence considered to be more risky. Stocks with a beta
of 1.0 fluctuate in price at the same rate as the market, while stocks with a beta
less than 1.0 fluctuate less than the market. Therefore, TARP banks had greater
systematic risk than non-TARP banks before the CPP announcement.
When examining βi1 during the CPP announcement, systematic risk decreased
for the eight required banks and large banks that received CPP capital and those
that did not. This is interesting because investors of large banks did not know that
their banks would eventually get money. Investors only knew that banks would have
the opportunity to apply and receive government loaned capital. However, βi2, is of
greater interest because it examines how systematic risk changes the year after TARP.
I find that large TARP banks have a significant decrease in risk after the event.
The more interesting CPP events to study are the capital infusion and capital
repayment. Examining how large bank stocks move relative to the market in the year
after banks pay back CPP capital can indicate whether investors believe the capital
led banks to be riskier in the future. In the year after banks received CPP capital,
systematic risk, or βi2, increased for the eight required banks and large TARP and
non-TARP banks (+0.1208, +0.1033 and +0.6056, respectively). However, only the
large TARP bank increase was significant. This means that large TARP bank stocks
had more price volatility than the overall market and were riskier than the year
prior to the bank receiving CPP capital. Interestingly, small bank stocks had less
price volatility than the overall market after receiving CPP capital. The dissimilar
change in beta the year after receiving capital for TARP banks and non-TARP banks
indicates that investors perceived TARP-banks to be riskier after receiving capital.
Investors may have thought that the CPP capital was not enough to cover possible
capital shortfalls or that the loaned capital would lead to a “moral hazard” issue–
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banks will make riskier investments now that they have additional capital and know
that the government would aid them in rough times.
In Table 1.3C, systematic risk decreased during the capital repayment event win-
dow (represented by βi1) for both TARP and non-TARP banks. Systematic risk also
decreased in the year after a bank repaid back CPP capital for the eight required
banks, large TARP banks, large non-TARP banks and mid-size non-TARP banks.
This result supports the idea that the CPP was successful at mitigating large bank
risk after banks repaid the capital. My previous results indicate that this is not true
before banks repay back the money, but after they repay it systematic risk falls. Ad-
ditionally, banks would have not been permitted to pay back the CPP capital if they
were not sound. If investors thought that banks were better capitalized after repaying
CPP capital, systematic risk should go down the year after the event. Alternatively,
mid-size and small TARP banks saw a slight increase in systematic risk in the year
after repaying CPP capital (+0.079 and +0.1277, respectively). It is important to
note that βi2 represents the change in β from the year before the capital repayment
to the year post the repayment, so the positive βi2 means that mid- and small-sized
banks still have a beta <1.0
Further, Figure 1.4 shows the evolution of betas from 2000-2014 for the eight
banks that were required to take CPP capital. Overall, banks follow a similar trend
from 2000 to 2014 with low betas in 2005-2006 and high betas in 2008-2009. My
results from the market model mirror Figure 1.4, as they show that betas were high
during the financial crisis and the immediate year after, but slowly decreased over
time. Particularly, Wells Fargo had a beta of approximately 0.50 in year 2000. Their
beta increased dramatically to about 2.5 in 2009. This means that Wells Fargo’s
stock returns varied 2.5 times more than the overall market return. However, Wells
Fargo’s beta decreases to about 1.0 in 2014, which indicates that Wells Fargo’s stock
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returns now move proportionally with the market. The black and purple dotted lines
represent the betas of Citigroup and Bank of America, which were the two banks
most in need of CPP capital.37 By the end of 2014, Citigroup and Bank of America’s
betas are near 1.2 which is similar to pre-crisis beta levels. So, despite the betas
decreasing after the financial crisis, they have not decreased to levels less than before.
1.7 Sample Matching to Test TARP Selection Issues
To address the potential sample selection issue that banks that received TARP
capital were larger than banks that did not, TARP banks are matched to non-TARP
banks based upon similarities in financial characteristics. A match is declared if there
are two banks, one in each sample, for which the value of a financial characteristic
is identical. Since identical financial characteristics between banks are difficult to
find in data, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching is best performed
conditioning on the probability of being in TARP on the financial characteristic.
This probability is known as the propensity score of the financial characteristic.
Since I do not know the probability a bank receives TARP money, I must calculate
the propensity score for bank i (i = 1, ..., N), which is the conditional probability of
being assigned to treatment (TARP=1) vs. control (TARP=0) given a vector of
observed covariates, such as non-performing loans to total loans, long-term debt to
total assets, ROA, credit-exposure on off-balance sheet contracts to Tier 1 capital
37Citigroup and Bank of America both received $25 billion of CPP capital in 2008. However, they
also received an additional $20 billion in the TARP Targeted Investment Program, which provided
capital to only two “systematically significant” institutions (U.S. Department of Treasury). Addi-
tionally, these banks greatly benefited from concurrent programs from the FDIC, Federal Reserve
and Treasury during the financial crisis.
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and the liquidity ratio. This is represented by Equation (1.5).
TARPBank = π0 + π1..N(Covariates) + εi (1.5)




TARP Bank = a dummy variable for banks that received TARP capital
Non-Performing Loans = loans 90 days past due/ total loans
Long Term Debt = long term debt/total assets
ROA = net income/ total assets38
Credit Exposure Off-Balance Sheet = current credit exposure on off-balance sheet
contracts/ Tier 1 capital
Liquidity ratio = cash/total assets
Covariates = non-performing loans to total loans, long-term debt to total assets,
ROA, credit-exposure on off-balance sheet contracts to Tier 1 capital and the liquid-
ity ratio
εit= a disturbance term with zero mean
Empirically this involves a three part process. First I must assign propensity
38Elyasiani et al. (2014) use a similar measure for ROA, which is typically proxied by either net
income/total assets or retained earnings/total assets in the literature. Using either specification
does not drastically change my results.
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scores in Equation (1.5) and create a matching equation based upon the propensity
scores. Then, I create a matched sample and estimate the average treatment effect
of returns using Equation (1.6). Table 1.4 represents the probit regression used to
estimate propensity scores on the basis of which the matching is subsequently done.
The probability of a bank participating in the CPP increases with long-term debt,
ROA and credit exposure. Even though non-performing loans and the liquidity ratio
have weak predictive ability in the selection into the CPP, including them can still be
helpful to minimize bias in estimating casual effects in propensity score matching. As
De Silva (2012) states, the ultimate goal is not to predict selection into treatment, but
to balance covariates and get closer to the observationally identical non-participant.39
Table 1.42 reports the estimates of Equation (1.6) with nearest neighbor matching.
In every case using propensity score matching yields estimates similar to what is found
in Table 1.2A-C. I report the average treatment effect that being in TARP has on
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the CPP announcement, capital infusion
and capital repayment as well as the average treatment of the untreated (or non-TARP
bank group) and the average treatment effect. I find that the difference in cumulative
returns for the announcement between banks that received TARP and banks that
did not was 4.19% in Table 1.2A, whereas after matching banks with similar financial
characteristics I find that the difference is 3.62%. For the infusion, the Newey-West
regression in Table 1.2B yields a difference of approximately 0.47% between TARP
banks and non-TARP banks, whereas nearest neighbor matching results in Table 1.42
yield 0.87%, which is slightly larger. Therefore, even after correcting for bias between
TARP banks and non-TARP banks the cumulative return results still hold.
39Examining the common support regions in a histogram indicate that characteristics in the CPP
bank group also appear in non-CPP banks.
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1.8 Conclusion
The conventional wisdom was that the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), would benefit large banks over small sized
banks, magnifying the claim that banks were Too Big to Fail. In this paper, I use an
event study analysis to examine whether investors react differently to key CPP events
to determine whether investors viewed the CPP as a program that disproportionately
helped larger banks. Event study analysis on investor reactions to the CPP is not new
in the literature, however my paper is the first to examine whether investor reactions
to the CPP are different, depending on the asset size of banks. The literature on
small and large bank efficiency shows that banks of different asset sizes perform and
operate differently, so investor reactions to the CPP may vary based on the asset size
of banks.
I find that the reactions by investors to the CPP were different depending on
the asset size of banks. The eight banks that were required to accept CPP capital
had a 10.67% cumulative average abnormal return at the program’s announcement
compared to a 10.17% abnormal return for other large banks that received CPP
capital and a 7.61% abnormal return for large banks that did not participate in the
program. Investors of large banks clearly saw the CPP announcement as a positive
signal that the overall banking industry would be better capitalized or that their banks
would eventually enter into the CPP program and receive capital. However, small
banks that later entered into the CPP had an abnormal return of 1.59%, whereas
small banks that did not participate in the CPP had a negative abnormal return.
Even after correcting for any potential sample bias (such as larger banks were more
likely to receive CPP capital) by propensity score matching, I still find that banks
that participated in the CPP received a higher abnormal return during the program’s
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announcement and those returns were greater for bigger banks.
In the year after banks received CPP capital, systematic risk or market risk,
increased for the eight banks that were required to enter the program. Additionally,
systematic risk also increased for large TARP and non-TARP banks. This indicates
that large bank stocks had more price volatility than the overall market and were
riskier compared to the year before a bank received capital. Interestingly, small
bank stocks had less price volatility than the overall market after receiving loaned
government capital. The dissimilar change in beta the year after receiving capital,
for large banks and small banks, indicates that investors perceived large banks to be
riskier after receiving CPP capital. Investors may have thought that the capital was
not enough to cover possible capital shortfalls or that the loaned capital would lead
to a “moral hazard” issue– banks will make riskier investments now that they have
additional capital and know that the government will aid them in rough times.
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Figure 1.1: Snapshot of the Economy, 2007-2009
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Figure 1.2: Capital Infusions, 2008-2009
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Figure 1.3: Capital Repayments, 2009-2013
31














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: Abnormal Returns During Three TARP Events
(1) (2)
Banks N Newey-West Newey-West+FF
A. Announcement
TARP 219 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0089)
Non-TARP 219 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0082)
Required 8 8 0.1204∗∗∗ 0.1067∗∗
(0.0381) (0.0380)
Large TARP 74 0.1549∗∗∗ 0.1017∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0155)
Large Non-TARP 37 0.1176∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0188)
Mid-Size TARP 65 0.0869∗∗∗ 0.0560∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0155)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 62 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0487∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0144)
Small TARP 72 0.0217 0.0159∗∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0145)
Small Non-TARP 120 -0.0092 -0.0153∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0107)
B. Infusion
TARP 219 -0.0370∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0083)
Non-TARP 219 -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0069)
Required 8 8 -0.1045∗∗∗ -0.0710∗
(0.0358) (0.0356)
Large TARP 74 -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.0762
(0.0091) (0.0095)
Large Non-TARP 37 -0.0430∗∗∗ -0.0427∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0147)
Mid-Size TARP 65 -0.0324∗∗ -0.0277∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0138)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 62 -0.0314∗∗ -0.0298∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0121)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.2 – Continued from previous page
Banks N Newey-West Newey-West+FF
Small TARP 72 -0.0384∗ -0.0338∗
(0.0189) (0.0191)
Small Non-TARP 120 -0.0084 -0.0076
(0.0096) (0.0098)
C. Capital Repayment
TARP 186 0.0166∗ 0.0183∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0089)
Non-TARP 212 -0.0012 -0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0052)
Required 8 8 0.0090 0.0175
(0.0145) (0.0176)
Large TARP 70 0.0048 0.0073
(0.0055) (0.0055)
Large Non-TARP 36 0.0039 0.0012
(0.0092) (0.0097)
Mid-Size TARP 50 0.0104 0.0142∗
(0.0077) (0.0075)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 61 0.0006 0.0034
(0.0087) (0.0089)
Small TARP 58 0.0372 0.0352
(0.0267) (0.0270)
Small Non-TARP 115 -0.0038 -0.0028
(0.0078) (0.0078)






surrounding the three TARP-CPP events: announcement, capital infusion
and capital repayment are reported. Cumulative abnormal returns are
calculated
∑N
i=1 ARit, where AR = Rit − E(Rit). Expected returns for each
bank are estimated over a 250 day pre-event window. Standard errors
are parentheses. The cumulative average abnormal return for the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Sample Selection Test: Propensity
Score Matching
1.41 Probit
Estimates Coefficient Std. Error
Non-performing loans -11.0316 12.0798
Long-term debt 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0078
ROA 18.2928∗∗∗ 4.9471
Credit exposure 1.1961∗∗ 0.5623
Liquidity ratio -0.7471 2.8478
Pseudo-R2 0.0575
1.42 Impact on
Cumulative Returns ATT ATU ATE
CPP Announcement 0.0592 0.0234 0.0362
CPP Infusion -0.0206 -0.2966 0.0087
CPP Capital Repayment 0.0085 -0.0020 0.0088
Table 1.41 reports the probit regression used to estimate propen-
sity scores. A match is declared if there are two banks, one in each
sample, for which the value of a financial characteristic is identical.
Rosenbaum and Rubin(1983) show that matching is best performed
conditioning on the probability of being selected into a group (in
my case, the TARP-CPP) on group characteristics. Table 1.42 re-
ports the cumulative abnormal returns for the treated group (banks
that entered into TARP), the untreated group (banks that did not
receive TARP capital) and the average treatment effect.
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2 The Effect of Nontraditional Banking on Entry
into TARP and Bank Failure
2.1 Introduction
Starting in the early 2000s, there was a shift in banking activities away from tra-
ditional banking, where loans are made with insured deposits, towards securitized
banking, where loans previously held on balance sheets are sold in capital markets.40
At the start of the financial crisis in 2007, there was over $2.5 trillion in U.S. asset-
backed securities outstanding.41 At the same time, there was an increase in bank
failures and government-assisted bank bailouts. There were 373 banks that failed
during the financial crisis and the years immediately after, while 707 banks or bank-
holding companies received government loans through the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP).42 This paper investigates the empirical relationship between a banks
involvement in various nontraditional activities and the likelihood that a bank fails
or receives TARP funding. I find that banks are more likely to enter into TARP if
they have more standby letters of credit and commercial letters of credit.43 Banks
that also have less capital adequacy, less return on assets (ROA) and more real estate
loans are also likely to enter into TARP. Similarly, banks that failed during 2007-2011
had less capital adequacy, less ROA, more real estate loans and more standby letters
of credit.
40Securitized banking is also called nontraditional banking.
41This number is taken from Gorton and Metrick (2011). They report that by April 2011, there
were $11 trillion of asset-backed securities sold, which was more than all outstanding U.S. Treasuries
combined.
42Underneath TARP, the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) provided the largest government bank
loan program ever.
43These off-balance sheet items obligate a bank to provide funding to a securitization structure
to ensure that investors receive timely payment on securities or in the event of market disrup-
tions(Mandel et. al 2012).
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The striking similarity of entry into TARP and bank failure based on balance
sheet and off-balance sheet bank characteristics has not been previously discussed in
the literature. Further, among the numerous studies that either examine bank failure
or entry into TARP during the recent crisis, emphasis on nontraditional activities
is missing. In particular, studies by Li (2013) and Duchin and Sosyura (2012) esti-
mate the likelihood a bank enters into TARP based on observable bank and political
characteristics, but do not mention off-balance sheet bank characteristics. Both pa-
pers use balance sheet bank characteristics to proxy for the CAMELS ratings that
bank regulators determine during on-site examinations.44 They find that ROA, tier
one capital ratio and asset quality (measured by a computed troubled assets ratio)
are statistically significant in determining whether a bank receives TARP funding.
Further, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) collect data on each bank’s connection to politi-
cians and determine a small, positive effect on the entry into TARP. I find similar
results to both papers, but by including standby letters of credit and commercial
letters of credit among other off-balance sheet items, I am able to explore the effect
nontraditional banking had on entry into TARP.
Other literature such as Cole and Gunther (1995 and 1998), Gasbarro et. al (2002),
and Wilson and Wheelock (1995) examine bank failures and the determinants of bank
failures also using bank characteristics to proxy CAMELS ratings. Collectively, these
papers do not find statistically significant results for all proxies of CAMELS, but they
do find that a bank is more likely to fail if it has lower capital adequacy, asset quality
and profitability. Also similar to the bank failure literature, I find that a bank with
lower capital adequacy, asset quality and profitability is more likely to fail during
2007-2011. Due to the rise of nontraditional banking, it is imperative to not only
include balance sheet bank characteristics, but also off-balance sheet characteristics
44 CAMELS ratings are not public knowledge.
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when examining bank failures and entry into TARP.
2.2 The Rise of Nontraditional Banking
In the traditional banking system, banks make loans and accept deposits that are
insured by the government. However, non-retail deposits, which are deposits held in
a bank or firm on somebody’s behalf are not insurable. The rise of nontraditional
banking started in the early 1990s when banks provided “safe” ways for non-retail
depositors (sovereign wealth funds, mutual funds and cash-rich companies) to implic-
itly insure deposits via collateral (Gorton and Metrick 2012a). Further, Pozsar (2011)
claims that, on the demand side, these institutional cash pools desire liquidity and
wanted to allocate cash to safe asset classes, but there was not enough U.S. Treasuries
for pools to hold due to large amounts of Treasuries being held by foreigners.45 As a
result, banks substituted the government guaranteed assets for short-term debt prod-
ucts, like repurchase agreements and asset-backed commercial paper which provided
collateral for the risk, and offered them to non-retail depositors.46
The financial assets that serve as collateral are found on the off-balance sheet
and are securitized or pooled together by a special purpose vehicle to form a security
that has a claim against the cash flows of the underlying assets.47 Collateral for
asset-backed commercial paper was typically mortgages and credit-card receivables,
but due to the housing boom in the early 2000s, frequently mortgages or mortgage-
45This alludes to the fact that buying Treasuries, drives up the price and drives down the yield.
46A repurchase agreement, or repo, is a short term deposit in a bank, where the bank promises
to pay back the repo rate. In other words, repo agreements are when an investors buys some asset
from a bank for $X and the bank agrees to repurchase it for $Y at some time in the future. The
repo rate, or percentage (Y-X)/X, is analogous to the interest rate on a bank deposit. For example,
if an asset has a market value of $100 and a bank sells it for $70 with an agreement to repurchase
it at $77 then the repo rate is 10%. If a bank defaults on the the promise to repurchase the asset
(collateral) then the investor keeps the asset collateral (Gorton and Metrick 2012a).
47 A detailed analysis of how securitization works and why bank’s choose to securitize can be
found in the Appendix.
42
backed securities were used as collateral (Gordon and Metrick 2012b).
One problem with securitized banking was that average haircuts for collateral
began steadily rising when borrowers started to default on their mortgages in 2007.
Haircuts are the percentage difference between market value of an asset used for
collateral and the amount of the deposit.48 Gorton and Metrick (2012a) show that
the repo-haircut index drastically increased in 2007 from about 0% in January to 10%
by December 2007, increasing to nearly 45% by January 2009. Increasing haircuts can
create bank insolvency, because if a bank has $100 million in collateral and needs $100
million in cash, a bank is unable to obtain that amount with a high haircut. By mid
2008, the weighted-average haircut was near 25%, so in this example a bank would be
short $25 million dollars in July 2008.49 In order to make up for the cash shortage of
$25 million, banks sought to issue new securities. Usually unable to make up the cash
selling new securities, banks then were forced to sell assets. The increasing sale of
assets, drove down asset prices further which created a downward cycle. In addition,
several asset classes were also no longer being accepted as collateral, which further
exacerbated the problem (Covitz et al. 2011 and Gordon and Metrick 2012b).
Due to lack of collateral for the asset-backed commercial paper, investors moved
away from asset-backed commercial paper to unsecured money market mutual funds.50
As Gorton and Metrick (2012b) point out, the size of the asset-backed commercial
paper market fell by $350 billion, or approximately 30%, in the second half of 2007.
Money market mutual funds were considered safer assets, until the Lehman Brothers
48More specifically, a haircut is the percentage, or (Z-X/X), of the difference in the deposit of a
repo transaction, X, and the underlying asset, Z. In the previous example, if an asset has a market
value of $100 and a bank sells it for $70 with an agreement to repurchase it at $77 then the haircut
is 30%. If a bank defaults on the promise to repurchase the asset (collateral) then the investor keeps
the asset (collateral) (Gorton and Metrick 2012a).
49If the repo market size is $100 million, with haircuts near 0%, banks can achieve the desired
amount of cash needed. In traditional banking, when a bank needs cash it must raise deposit rates
to attract customers, whereas in nontraditional banking banks must raise the repo rates.
50These funds are privately managed and invested in short term, globally diversified assets.
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bankruptcy in September. This caused the Reserve Primary Fund, which was a large
money market mutual fund that primarily held Lehman Brothers debt,51 to “break
the buck” (McCabe 2010).52 Money market fund investors pulled their investments
after this event, forcing money market mutual funds to sell assets, which caused a
decline in the prices of money market instruments. This also prompted a cycle of
capital losses which further encouraged redemptions. This withdrew liquidity from
the market and eventually these “runs” on the market became so frequent that fed-
eral monetary support for the banking industry ensued, providing short term money
market guarantees and eventual bank bailouts via the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(Gorton and Metrick 2012b).
2.2.1 Background and TARP
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was one of the largest programs
implemented by the U.S. government to address the financial crisis. This program
authorized the Treasury to buy $700 billion in troubled assets in order to stabilize the
economy and provide needed credit.53 On October 14, 2008 the Treasury announced
its first, and largest, of six TARP bank programs, the Capital Purchase Program
(CPP). Under this program, the Treasury loaned over $200 billion dollars directly to
financial institutions. In return for their capital, the Treasury Department received
preferred stock with a 5% dividend for the first five years and 9% thereafter. Addi-
tionally, they received warrants to purchase common stock up to 15% of the initial
capital investments in order to benefit from the equity appreciation of the financial
institution.
51This debt was valued at $785 million.
52Breaking the buck means that the share price falls below $1.
53More specifically, TARP was designed to provide capital to the financial sector specifically for
“residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are
based on or related to such mortgages” (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008).
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Under the CPP, financial institutions could apply for capital between 1% and 3%
of their risk-weighted assets. However when the CPP was announced, the Treasury
Secretary, Henry Paulson Jr., stated that the nation’s largest banks would receive
money, but other financial institutions would be able to apply in the ensuing weeks.54
Domestically controlled banks, bank holding companies, savings associations, and
savings and loan companies were eligible to apply for TARP funding by the dead-
line of November 14, 200855 to their primary federal banking regulator.56 After the
federal banking regulator received the application, they would send their recommen-
dation to the Office of Financial Stability at the Treasury Department. The Treasury
Department made final decisions as to which banks would receive capital.
I construct my TARP dataset from the U.S. Treasury Department TARP Trans-
action Report, Summary of Deposit data and commercial bank Call Reports. Since I
am interested in evaluating on- and off-balance sheet bank characteristics, as it relates
to bank entry into TARP and commercial bank failures, I have to match the TARP
banks sample to commercial banks. In order to do that, I match the Summary of De-
posit data which includes all commercial banks and their top bank holding company
to the TARP bank sample. Most banks that received TARP-CPP were members of
a bank-holding company that held either one commercial bank or held multiple com-
mercial banks. There were 318 TARP banks that were members of a bank-holding
company that held multi-commercial banks. Like Li (2013), I assume that if a bank
holding company received TARP capital, they distributed it equally to all commercial
54The largest institutions that did not have to apply for money, but were required to take it,
were JPMorgan Chase, State Street Corp. Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Bank of America,
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, and Merrill Lynch. Since Merrill Lynch was acquired
by Bank of America, I will hereafter refer to only the eight banks that were required to take TARP
capital.
55Analysis on the timing of capital infusions and investor reactions can be found in Zanzalari
(2015).
56This includes the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office
of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) or the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
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banks within their bank holding company.57 After matching the TARP bank sample
to the Summary of Deposit data, this enables me to use Call Report data to obtain
on- and off-balance sheet characteristics. Call Report data is obtained from 2007-2011
consisting of quarterly observations of approximately 6,500 banks.
2.2.2 Bank failures
Data on participating TARP banks and their corresponding commercial banks are
merged with data on the FDIC failed bank list and the Federal Reserve of Chicago
merged bank list. Using the FDIC definition of failure, a failure is when the govern-
ment intervenes in a merger or a pay off. Based on this definition, 373 banks failed
during 2007-2011 with some failures more geographically concentrate than others.
Figure 2.1 shows a timeline of bank failures from 2007-2011. Bank failures increase
dramatically during 2009-2010, or during the financial crisis.58 There were 2 bank
failures in 2007, 36 bank failures in 2008, 137 bank failures in 2009, 123 bank fail-
ures in 2010, and 75 in 2011. I focus on bank failures that happened during the
official recession period from December 2007-June 2009 and those that occurred in
the immediate period after the financial crisis in July 2009-December 2011.
Banks that failed with government assistance are represented by the solid line in
Figure 2.1 which indicates that the financial institution ceases to exist and disposition
was arranged by the FDIC, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), National Credit
Union Association (NCUA) or another regulatory agency.59 This means that assets
57Data on how a bank exactly uses their funds is not disclosed. Numerous papers study the effects
of TARP on bank activity. Specifically, Li(2013) finds evidence that bank loan supply increases for
banks with below median Tier 1 capital ratios; Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that banks shift risk
within the same asset class after TARP thus going undetected by regulatory capital ratios; Black
and Hazelwood (2011) find that the risk of loan originations increases at large TARP banks and
decreases at small TARP banks.
58The recession officially started in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, although bank failures
continued after the official end date of the recession.
59RTC was formed by Congress is 1989 to respond to Savings & Loan insolvencies (Federal Reserve
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from the ceased financial institution may be distributed to the regulatory agency or
to another financial institution. The dotted line in Figure 2.1 shows undercapitalized
mergers which are mergers that occurred without government assistance with the
acquired bank having a tier one ratio <0.04.60 Banks with a Tier 1 ratio of <0.04
are classified by the FDIC as ‘undercapitalized’, and thus, the FDIC would begin to
set up a plan with the bank for re-capitalization. If a bank fails to meet the required
Tier 1 capital levels, the FDIC may start the process of finding a government-assisted
buyer. Therefore, if a bank with a Tier 1 capital ratio of <0.04 merges with another
bank, and no longer exists as an institution, I call this a undercapitalized merger.
As Koetter et al. (2007) mention, most studies that analyze bank takeovers do not
distinguish between healthy and troubled banks due to the scarcity of failures without
supervisory authorities. Particularly, there were only 15 undercapitalized mergers
that occurred between 2007-2011.61 Therefore, I include undercapitalized mergers
with banks that failed with government assistance in a separate specification to see
if bank characteristics have different effects on both private undercapitalized mergers
and government failures.
Additionally, Table 2.1 shows the importance of the real estate during the 2007-
2009 recession and the years after as the states with most bank failures also had
a large proportion of delinquent homes. Georgia, Illinois, Florida and California
were the states with the most bank failures during 2007-2011, while the 90+ day
delinquency rates across the United States were among the highest in Florida and
Nevada. Georgia, Florida, Illinois and Nevada were states with a high number of
Bank of Chicago).
60I do not model the decision of why some banks are acquired and others do not. Wheelock and
Wilson (2000) find that the lower a bank’s equity/asset ratio and return on assets, the more likely it
was to be acquired in 1984. However, banks with high ratios of real estate owned to total assets were
less likely to be acquired, whereas small banks and banks that were members of holding companies
were more likely to be acquired.
61Undercapitalized mergers during this time period are <2% of total bank mergers.
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bank failures and were among the top ten states with the highest delinquency rates
in the United States during 2007-2011. Since I do not have individual mortgage
delinquencies per bank, I will use real estate loans as an explanatory variable for
bank failure.
2.3 Methodology and Data
To understand how bank entry into TARP and bank failures during 2007-2011 are
associated with on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet characteristics, I estimate the
three following probit regressions:
P (TARP = 1|X) = Φ(α+ β1Bankcharacteristics+ β2PoliticalandSizeControls) (2.1)
P (FAIL = 1|X) = Φ(α+ β1Bankcharacteristics+ β2PoliticalandSizeControls) (2.2)
P (UNCMERGE = 1|X) = Φ(α+ β1Bankcharacteristics+ β2PoliticalandSizeControls) (2.3)
where TARP is an indicator variable equaling one if a bank received TARP capital,
FAIL is an indicator variable equaling one if a bank fails with government assistance
from December 2007-December 2011 and UNCMERGE is an indicator variable equal-
ing one if a bank fails with government assistance or is an undercapitalized merger
during December 2007- December 2011.62 Equations (2.1)-(2.3) include the same
bank characteristics and political/size controls.
2.4 Balance sheet bank characteristics
Previous studies that investigate entry into TARP, such as Duchin and Sosyura
(2012) and Li (2013), use bank characteristics that proxy for the CAMELS rating
system to measure bank performance. The CAMELS rating system is used by bank
62I also estimate probit regressions for bank failures that specifically occur in 2009 and 2010.
These year-specific probit regressions are reported in the Appendix in Table 3.10.
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regulators during onsite examinations, but the results are not publically available.
The six factors that banks are evaluated on are: Capital adequacy, Asset quality,
Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. Duchin and Sosyura
(2012) find that their measures of capital adequacy and earnings are significant across
various specifications. They use Tier 1 capital ratio and ROA to measure the C and
E of ‘CAMELS’. Li (2013) only found the troubled asset ratio to be significant across
variable specifications. Li defines the troubled asset ratio as loans past due 90 days
or more plus non-accrual loans and other real estate owned all divided by a bank’s
capital and loan loss reserves.63
Earlier studies on bank failures also have mixed results on the predictability of
the CAMELS ratings on bank failures. Gasbarro et. al (2002) uses a unique dataset
from the Bank of Indonesia to measure the CAMEL ratings of 52 Indonesian banks
using a fixed effects and random effects model and find only earnings to be the
critical variable in explaining the ratings. Similarly, Cole and Gunther (1998) measure
CAMEL ratings as it relates to bank failures in 1986-1988 and in 1988-1990 and
they find that only capital adequacy, asset quality and profitability are statistically
significant in predicting bank failures.64 Further, they find that the information
content of CAMEL ratings decays rapidly, so the ability to identify failures is best
when using Call Report data no more than one to two quarter prior to the forecast
period.
To account for balance sheet variables that are significant in previous bank failure
studies and in more recent entry into TARP studies, I use the following on- balance
sheet measures:
63A detailed analysis of bank characteristics are defined in the Appendix.
64This result is similar to Martin (1977), Gajewski (1989), Demirguc-Kunt (1989) and Cole and
Gunther (1995). Also, in 1997 U.S. regulators added the S to CAMEL to capture banks’ sensitivity
to global competitive markets. Since most of the literature measured CAMEL ratings for the early
1990s and 2000s, and S is difficult to proxy for, many authors do not include S in their ratings.
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Tier 1 ratio = Tier 1 capital/ risk weighted assets
Troubled assets ratio= (loans past due 90 days or more + nonaccrual loans + other
real estate owned)/(Tier 1 capital + loan loss reserve)
ROA= return on assets; net income/ total assets
Real estate loans= real estate loans/ total loans
Non-performing loans= loans 90 days past due or more /total loans
The tier 1 ratio represents a bank’s ability to absorb losses on assets of different
classes. The troubled asset ratio was used by Li (2013) and approximates a bank’s
asset quality. If a bank has more tier one capital to risk-weighted assets, I would
expect them to be less likely to fail. Likewise, the Treasury department wanted to
disburse TARP funds to banks that were capital-constrained, but otherwise strong
banks. In the announcement of the TARP Capital Purchase Program, Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson Jr. stated that, “While many banks have suffered significant
losses during this period of market turmoil, many others have plenty of capital to
get through this period, but are not positioned to lend as widely as is necessary
to support our economy. Our goal is to see a wide array of healthy institutions sell
preferred shares to the Treasury, and raise additional private capital, so that they can
make more loans to businesses and consumers across the nation.” Paulson’s statement
reinforces that the Treasury wanted to lend to healthy banks, thus I hypothesize that
banks that received TARP capital will be banks with higher Tier 1 capital ratios.
Return on assets measures the net income a bank receives relative to their total
assets, which is a common proxy used to measure earnings in previous papers. Real
estate loans to total loans measures the exposure to the real estate market. I look
at real estate loans which can tell me the extent of how much or how little failed
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and non-failed banks were involved in the financial crisis. If a bank was involved in
a large number of real estate loans I would expect them to fail more often. Lastly,
non-performing loans measure the amount of loans that are past due by 90 days or
more divided by the total amount of loans a bank makes.
2.4.1 Off-balance sheet items
In addition to balance sheet bank characteristics, I include off balance sheet vari-
ables due to the increasing nature of nontraditional banking during the financial crisis.
Since banks were the driving force behind asset-backed commercial paper, and this
component is away from the traditional location of the balance sheet (Mandel et. al
2011), it is imperative to include off balance sheet items on the estimation of bank en-
try in TARP and on bank failure during 2007-2011. Hassan (1993) also indicates that
both balance sheet and off-balance sheet variables should be included in evaluating
risk since they generally have a low correlation which makes multicollinearity a non-
issue. The correlation matrix of variables can be found in Table 2.2. All off-balance
sheet items reported are as a percentage of total assets.65 The off-balance sheet items
that I examine are: standby letters of credit, assets securitized or sold with recourse,
commercial letters of credit, amount of recourse exposure, and all other off-balance
sheet items.
Standby letters of credit are binding commitments for banks to pay a beneficiary.
Particularly, these are often used as backups for other capital market financing, like
commercial paper (Berger and Roman 2015). Commercial letters of credit are the
outstanding or unused amount of commercial or travelers’ letters of credit not issued
for money. Each of these variables indicates a future draw on a bank’s assets. Standby
65This is one way to normalize off-balance sheet items to allow for easy comparison to balance
sheet variables. Berger and Roman (2015) use gross total assets which equals total assets plus loan
and lease losses and allocated transfer risk reserve in order to account for the value of assets financed.
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letters of credit are a guarantee from a bank to a third party, whereas commercial
letters of credit are a commitment to facilitate in commerce by a bank and a third
party. More specifically, commercial letters of credit are drawn upon in the normal
course of business, whereas standby letters of credit are not, unless the account party
defaults. The two primary areas of risk relative to standby letters of credit are credit
risk and funding risk. Credit risk is the risk of default on the account party and
funding risk is the inability of a bank to fund credit from normal sources.66
Assets securitized or sold with recourse are any assets bundled together in tranches
and resold, or assets with seller-provided credit enhancements. The amount of re-
course exposure is similar in that it is the maximum amount of credit exposure
arriving from recourse. All other off-balance sheet items include commitments to
purchase and sell securities, commitments to purchase property being acquired for
lease to others, contracts on equities and other off-balance sheet liabilities.
2.4.2 Controls
Beyond the balance sheet and off-balance sheet variables listed above, I use bank
characteristics of size, age and number of branches as controls. I divide banks into
different groups based on quintiles of asset size in Quarter 3 2008. The smallest
quintile is for banks with assets less than or equal to $51,687,000 and is referred to as
extra-small. Small are banks with assets >$51,687,000 in assets up to $100,271,000.
Medium are banks with assets >$100,271,000, but less than or equal to $180,418,000,
whereas large have assets >180,418,000 and up to $390,222,000. The largest bank
category, which is called extra large, is omitted in the analysis. The nation’s largest
banks are what most people think about when considering banks, TARP and the
66More detail on variables on the off-balance sheet can be in found in the Appendix.
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financial crisis, so comparing to this base group makes sense.67
Further, I control for the number of branches that a bank has. The Treasury was
worried about systemic problems that would pose a risk to the economy. Therefore,
the Treasury may have been more likely to give capital to banks that had multiple
branches.68 Lastly, I control for regulatory connections like Li (2013) and Duchin
and Sosyura (2012).69 Since the Federal Reserve is the primary regulatory body
for state-chartered banks and bank-holding companies, it is important to control for
the potential influence the Federal Reserve would have on bank entry into TARP.70
Further, the FDIC may be less likely to let a bank fail if the bank has been around
for a long time.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Summary Statistics on TARP and failed banks
Table 2.3 reports the mean values and standard deviations for TARP and non-
TARP banks in Quarter 3, 2008. Since banks had to apply for TARP before November
14, 2008, Quarter 3, 2008 data will be the most recent that bank regulators would
67These quintiles change slightly when omitting the eight banks that were “forced” to take TARP.
Those quintiles are reported below Table 2.5B.
68Ng and Roychowhury (2014) use a different control variable, bank-holding company, since most
of the recipients of TARP-CPP capital were members of a bank-holding company. There were
318 TARP banks that were held by bank-holding companies that held multiple commercial banks.
However, the number of branches of a bank is more accurate in capturing how wide-spread a bank
crisis could be.
69Both papers also control for whether a bank executive served as a Director of the Fed. Li (2013)
additionally controls for campaign contributions to local Representatives from financial, insurance
and real estate agencies.
70The FDIC has supervisory authority over state-chartered banks, but most of them are held by
bank-holding companies whose applications must be submitted to the Federal Reserve. The OCC
regulates national banks, which follow federal banking laws and are required to be members of the
Federal Reserve System. The OTS, which is no longer exists after the financial crisis, supervised
savings institutions and thrifts which used to only give out residential mortgages and accept deposits.
Differences between the OTS and other federal regulators diminished over time (Duchin and Sosyura
2012).
53
use in making recommendations about TARP. TARP banks had total assets of $11.1
billion compared to $0.58 billion for non-TARP banks, but only $3.32 billion if the
eight banks (and their subsidiaries) are excluded.71 TARP banks have a slightly higher
mean troubled asset ratio, amount of recourse exposure, real estate loans and all other
off-balance sheet items to total assets compared to non-TARP banks. Also, TARP
banks have a greater number of standby letters of credit, assets securitized or sold with
recourse and commercial letters of credit. Excluding the required eight banks, standby
letters of credit fall a bit to 107% of total assets, but are still significantly larger than
banks that do not receive TARP capital. Assets securitized or sold with recourse
falls dramatically (from 139% of total assets to 90% of total assets) after excluding
the required eight banks, indicating that the nation’s biggest banks were largely
involved in securitizing assets with recourse.72 Lastly, twelve TARP banks failed
with government assistance, but none privately merged that were undercapitalized.
Table 2.4 reports the summary statistics for all failed banks. Column 1 reports
mean values and standard deviations for banks that failed with government assistance
and column 2 includes undercapitalized mergers into the sample of banks that failed
with government assistance. Mean values are reported for the quarter before a bank
fails.73 For almost all explanatory variables, there is a big discrepancy between banks
that failed and banks that did not. Banks that failed with government assistance had
a mean value of $610 million in assets compared to $1.44 billion for banks that did
not fail; tier 1 ratios are almost 1% compared to 12% for non-failed banks; troubled
asset ratio is at 253% compared to 8% for non-failed banks; real estate loans are 84%
71Zanzalari (2015) addresses sample selection issues by using propensity score matching techniques
on TARP and non-TARP bank samples.
72The number of banks in the total TARP sample to the TARP sample excluding the big eight de-
creases from 743 to 712, indicating that the eight bank-holding companies held multiple commercial
banks.
73This is done in order to compare banks that entered into TARP with banks that fail in the
quarter before each one occurs.
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of total loans for banks that failed compared to 67% of banks that did not; ROA, on
average, was negative 12% in the quarter before a bank fails compared to nearly 10%
for a bank that does not.74 Surprisingly, off-balance sheet items tend to be smaller
for banks that failed. Comparing summary statistics to those of TARP banks in
Table 2.3, TARP banks had high real estate loans compared to non-TARP banks,
just as failed banks had high real estate loans compared to banks that did not fail in
2007-2011.
2.5.2 Bank entry into TARP
There is not a publically available list of banks that applied to TARP and did not
receive money. Therefore, estimating bank entry into TARP assumes that all banks
had applied for TARP funding and thus probit estimates may be biased. Since it is
difficult to predict the direction of the bias, Li (2013) divides banks into two groups,
well-capitalized and less well-capitalized, because conceptually, banks that were over-
qualified would have been approved for TARP funds if they applied and banks that
were unqualified would have been rejected.75 Examining subsamples of banks allows
the problem of unobservable TARP applicants to be less severe. Following Li (2013),
I divide banks into three different specifications for Tables 2.5A-D. The full TARP
sample is reported in columns (1) and (2), less well-capitalized in columns (3) and
(4) and well-capitalized in columns (5) and (6). Since there were 596 of 743 TARP
banks with a below median tier 1 ratio, I will focus more on the subsample of less
well-capitalized banks. Column (2), (4) and (6) include all control variables.
74Some of the discrepancy between failed banks and non-failed banks may be a result of how
non-failed bank numbers are reported. Since more failures occurred in 2009 and 2010, the failed
bank means will be reported mostly from those quarters. However, I report the means of bank
characteristics for the non-fail sample over the entire 2007-2011 period.
75Li (2013) sorts banks based on whether they have a tier 1 ratio greater than the median and
less than the median.
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Table 2.5A reports the probit estimates for the entire TARP sample. The negative
coefficient on tier 1 ratio in column (4) indicates that banks with higher capital
adequacy were less likely to receive TARP capital. Further, banks are less likely to
get TARP capital if they have more troubled assets or non-performing loans. For
example, for every one unit change in the troubled asset ratio, the probability of
entering into TARP (versus not entering into TARP) decreases by 0.60 for the overall
sample and by 0.80 for less well-capitalized banks. Interestingly, banks with higher
real estate loans are more likely to get into TARP. When looking at off-balance
sheet bank characteristics, banks with more standby letters of credit and commercial
letters of credit are more likely to receive TARP funding. Taken together, these two
measures show that banks are more likely to enter into TARP if they are involved in
nontraditional activities.76
Political and regulatory controls also are significant in column (4). Banks are
more likely to receive TARP funding if it there are more bank branches.77 Further, a
bank is also more likely to receive TARP funding if they are regulated by the Federal
Reserve. Li (2013) and Duchin and Sosyura (2012) also find a positive and significant
estimate for the relationship between the Federal Reserve and a bank’s entry into
TARP. Lastly in Table 2.5A, banks are less likely to get TARP capital if they are
extra small, small, medium or large relative to being in the extra large grouping.78
Table 2.5B reports the probit estimates for the TARP sample, excluding the eight
76Further, in the full TARP sample specification a bank was more likely to enter into TARP if
a bank has greater assets securitized or sold with recourse, the subsample of less well-capitalized
banks makes this effect disappear.
77Mandel et al. (2011) states that securitization activity is related to whether a bank is in a
bank-holding company or is tied to multiple banks. However, I find that standby letters of credit
and whether a bank is in a bank-holding company has a correlation coefficient of 0.11.
78Recall that the size controls are broken into quintiles. The smallest quintile is for banks with
assets less than or equal to $51,687,000 and is referred to as extra-small. Small are banks with assets
>$51,687,000 in assets up to $100,271,000. Medium are banks with assets >$100,271,000, but less
than or equal to $180,418,000, whereas large have assets >180,418,000 and up to $390,222,000. The
largest bank category, which is called extra large, is omitted in the analysis.
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banks that were required to take TARP funding. I find similar results to those stated
in Table 2.5A. Further, I report the marginal effects at the mean Table 2.5C-D. Using
the estimates that exclude the required eight banks in Table 2.5D, column (4) shows
that if a bank with an average amount of troubled assets has 0.01 more troubled
assets, then the bank is 0.181 times less likely to get into TARP. I also find that for
one additional dollar of standby letters of credit to total assets, banks with an average
amount of standby letters of credit to total assets are 0.041 times more likely to enter
into TARP. Some of my control variables are categorical, so the marginal estimates on
a control variable indicate how the probability of a bank entering into TARP changes
when the control variables change from 0 to 1, holding all other variables at their
means. For example, the marginal estimate of 0.020 on the Federal Reserve regulator
variable means that when the variable Federal Reserve regulator changes from 0 to
1, a bank is 0.020 times more likely to enter into TARP.
2.5.3 Bank failure
Since balance sheet variables and off balance sheet variables are significant in
both probit regressions for entry into TARP in the full sample and the sample that
excludes the eight required banks, I am interested in examining whether the failed
bank sample also follows a similar pattern. Examining Table 2.6A, indicates that
banks with lower tier one ratios are more likely to fail during 2007-2011. Banks with
lower ROA, and more real estate loans are also more likely to fail during this time
period. Columns (2) and (4) in Table 2.6A-B include quarter fixed effects, since bank
failures occur during different quarters between 2007-2011.
When examining off-balance sheet items on bank failures from 2007-2011, I find
that the more standby letters of credit a bank has the more likely they are to fail. This
result can be seen in either bank failures that occurred with government assistance
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or the second specification which includes undercapitalized mergers. Specifically, the
marginal analysis in Table 2.6B column (2) indicates that for a one unit increase in
standby letters of credit to total assets for a bank, with a mean level of standby letters
of credit to total assets, leads to a 0.0001 greater chance (0.01%) of a bank failing.
Surprisingly, the more recourse exposure or other off-balance sheet items a bank has
the less likely it is to fail. Political and regulatory controls are also significant in
Tables 2.6A-B. Banks are less likely to fail if they are small, relative to the extra
large bank sample. Banks are more likely to fail if they are regulated by the Federal
Reserve, while they are also less likely to fail if they the bank has been established
for awhile.
Comparing the estimates of balance sheet variables in the failed bank probit anal-
ysis in Table 2.6A to the entry into TARP probit analysis in Table 2.5B, banks are
more likely to fail or receive TARP capital if they have lower tier one ratios, lower
ROAs, more real estate loans, and less non-performing loans. I also find similarities
between the probit analysis on entry into TARP and bank failures when examining
off-balance sheet variables. Banks are more likely to enter into TARP with greater
standby letters of credit, but the more standby letters of credit a bank has the more
likely a bank is also to fail. The relationship between certain balance sheet and off-
balance sheet items on entry into TARP and bank failure, provides evidence that
TARP may have helped banks that otherwise would have failed.
2.6 Bank Failure Robustness Check
Since the probit analysis on bank failure does not incorporate bank characteristics
over time, I use a Cox proportional hazard regression to test whether certain bank,
size and regulatory characteristics have an effect on bank failure. Wheelock and
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Wilson (1995 and 2000) state that a Cox proportional model allows the estimation to
incorporate changes in bank characteristics over time, whereas discrete choice models
only allow estimation on the probability that a bank fails within a specified time
interval.79 Using data from Kansas banks in 1910-1926, Wilson and Wheelock (1995)
find that weakly capitalized banks and those holding few reserves were more likely
to fail. More recently, Ng and Roychowhury (2014) use a Cox proportional model to
examine the effects of pre-crisis loan loss reserves on bank failures and find that the
higher level of total capital, the less likely a bank is to fail. Further, a higher level of
tier one capital is associated with a lower likelihood of bank failure80
The Cox proportional model incorporates information about the time before an
event occurs (time-to-failure). The probability of failure, which is called the hazard
rate, can be estimated by:
H(t) = H0(t) ∗ exp(β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + ...+ βNXN) (2.4)
where,
X1..XN = Tier 1 ratio, troubled assets ratio, ROA, real estate loans, non-performing
loans, standby letters of credit, assets securitized or sold with recourse, commercial
letters of credit, amount of recourse exposure, all other off-balance sheet items; con-
trols= number of branches, age of institution, Federal Reserve regulator, bank size
controls; H0(t) = baseline hazard at time(t).
The hazard rate is the instantaneous rate a bank fails at time t, conditional on the
bank surviving until time t. The Cox proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric
model, because the baseline hazard function, H0(t), does not have to be specified.
79In discrete choice models, like the probit, bank characteristics are necessarily assumed to be
constant.
80Cole and Wu (2009) split their 1980-1992 Call Report data into small banks and large banks
and find that smaller banks with higher levels of non-performing loans are more likely to fail.
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Since the hazard function is not restricted to a specific form, this model is flexible
and allows for a different parameter to be used for each survival time. The hazard
ratio can be interpreted similar to a probit or logit regression and thus is reported in
Table 2.7. The hazard ratio can be obtained by dividing both sides of the previous




) = β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + ...+ βNXN (2.5)
A hazard ratio of 1.0 means that the hazard rate of the failed and non-failed bank
group is equal. A hazard ratio other than one indicates a difference in hazard rates
between groups. More specifically, the coefficient on the explanatory bank character-
istic and regulatory variables represents a proportional change in the hazard rate for
a one-unit change in the explanatory variable.
Results from Table 2.7 show that banks with a higher Tier 1 ratio and more real
estate loans were less likely to fail with government assistance from December 2007-
December 2011. More specifically, banks with a 0.01 unit increase of real estate loans
to total loans were 1.0155 more likely to fail with government assistance than those
that were not. Also, banks with more branches, or banks that were smaller than the
large bank grouping, were less likely to fail than those that were not. Further, this
analysis shows that banks with a 0.01 unit increase in the tier one ratio are 0.5689
times less likely fail during 2007-2011. In the probit analysis in Table 2.6B, I find
that a bank with a tier one ratio equal to the mean level that has a one unit increase
in tier one is less likely to fail by 0.084.
There were a few minor differences compared to Tables 2.6A-B. For example,
banks with a 0.01 unit increase of ROA (net income/total assets) were 1.0037 times
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as likely to fail than those that were not, whereas the marginal effect for a bank with
a mean level of ROA on bank failure is -0.6%. A mild difference is also found with
standby letters of credit, although the hazard ratio is close to 1.0, which indicates that
they are not statistically different than 1.0. Hazard ratios including undercapitalized
mergers are also very similar to those for government assisted failures. Hazard ratio
results are directionally the same as the probit analysis for real estate loans, non-
performing loans and amount of recourse exposure. Overall the Cox proportional
hazard model yields results that mirror those in Tables 2.6A-B.81
2.7 Conclusion
The overwhelming increase of asset-backed commercial paper and securitized col-
lateral during the financial crisis in 2007-2009, coupled with the increasing number
of bank failures and government bank bailouts suggest that a bank’s involvement in
securitized banking may change the likelihood that a bank fails or enters into TARP.
In this paper, I estimate this potential relationship using a probit model for entry
into TARP and bank failures during 2007-2011. I find that a bank is more likely to
receive TARP funding if it has more standby letters of credit and commercial letters
of credit. Similarly, a bank is more likely to fail if it has more standby letters of
credit. My paper is the first to report this striking similarity in bank failures and
entry into TARP as most literature does not include bank characteristics related to
nontraditional banking activities.
However, the literature does include balance sheet bank characteristics when es-
timating entry into TARP or bank failure. I find that banks that enter into TARP
81I have included TARP as an explanatory variable, like Ng and Roychowhury (2014), and found
TARP to be < 1.0 and significant, indicating that banks that enter into TARP are less likely to fail
than those that do not. To allow for comparison to the explanatory variables in the failed bank and
TARP logistic regressions, I left TARP as an explanatory variable out.
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have a lower tier one ratio, lower ROAs and more real estate loans, which is consistent
with the result that Li (2013) and Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find. I also find that
banks are more likely to fail during 2007-2011 with lower tier one ratios, lower ROA
and more real estate loans. The significance of these balance sheet characteristics
are also found in Cole and Gunther (1998). There is also a striking similarity when
examining balance sheet bank characteristics in the two independent probit analyses
on bank failures and entry into TARP. The relationship between some balance sheet
and off-balance sheet items on bank failure is directionally similar to those on entry
into TARP, which suggests that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) may
have helped banks that otherwise would have failed.
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Figure 2.1: Bank Failures and Undercapitalized Mergers, 2007-2011
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Table 2.1: Bank Failures from December 2007-December
2011
State Number of Bank 90+ Day Delinquency Rank Among States
Failures Rate on Delinquency Rate
GA 59 8.0% 6
IL 42 9.2% 4
FL 33 17.4% 1
CA 27 7.0% 13
MN 15 4.6% 38
WA 14 6.2% 23
AZ 10 7.1% 12
MO 9 4.6% 40
NV 8 13.4% 2
MI 8 6.5% 20
Bank mergers and failures that occurred with government assistance during
December 2007-December 2011 are included. CoreLogic Nationals Foreclosure
data from December 2011 is used for 90+ Day Delinquency Rate. Other no-
table states missing from top bank failure list: NJ was ranked 3 and MD ranked


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for TARP Banks
TARP Banks TARP Banks Non-TARP All Banks
(excl. big 8) Banks
Panel A: Balance Sheet and Off-Balance Sheet
Assets ($ billions) 11.1 3.32 0.58 1.61
(9.69) (1.63) (9) (3.16)
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 9.46 9.10 12.2 11.9
(8.00) (6.52) (10.2) (9.99)
Troubled Assets Ratio (%) 16.5 16.8 15.2 15.3
(14.7) (14.8) (24.7) (23.9)
ROA (%) 8.68 8.22 10.4 10.2
(13.49) (12.96) (22.11) (21.4)
Real Estate Loans (%) 73.6 75.0 68.7 69.2
(17.6) (14.5) (19.9) (19.7)
Non-Performing Loans (%) 14.6 13.3 24.8 23.7
(24.0) (22.2) (33.3) (32.6)
Standby Letters of Credit (%) 112 107 40.5 47.5
(196) (183) (88.8) (106)
Assets Securitized or Sold 139 90 94.2 99
with Recourse (%) (925) (677) (872) (878)
Commercial Letters of Credit (%) 11.5 8.35 5.3 5.9
(91.8) (36.5) (27.8) (3.90)
Amount of Recourse Exposure (%) 14.9 12.9 13 13.2
(79.8) (67.6) (160) (154)
All other Off-Balance Sheet 129 76.1 117 117.9
Items (%) (1189) (648) (7065) (6722)
No. of branches 54.05 36.98 8.08 13.72
(317) (168) (60.43) (125)
Age of institution 63.51 62.65 68.34 67.73
(53.04) (51.84) (44.42) (45.62)
Panel B: Failure and Regulatory
No. of Banks 743 712 6886 7629
Regulator Federal Reserve 127 124 640 767
Failure with Gov’t Assistance 12 12 350 362
Private Merger 130 130 489 619
Undercapitalized Merger 0 0 11 11
All balance sheet and off-balance sheet mean values are reported from Quarter 3, 2008 Call Reports. Assets
are in billions. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. All failures and mergers reported are for those
that occur starting in December 2007-December 2011. Banks that have a Tier 1 ratio of < 0.04 and merge, are
classified by the FDIC as ‘undercapitalized’ and thus the FDIC would begin to set up a plan with the bank for
re-capitalization.
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Panel A: Summary Statistics for Banks
Assets ($ billions) 0.61 0.59 1.44
(1.65) (1.62) (2.9)
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 1.14 1.12 12.5
(2.82) (3.05) (11)
Troubled Assets Ratio (%) 253 249 8.23
(3065) (301) (12.8)
ROA (%) -12.9 -12.8 9.98
(14.8) (14.8) (2.08)
Real Estate Loans (%) 84.0 83.9 67.4
(13.0) (13.0) (19.8)
Non-Performing Loans (%) 5.86 5.89 29.8
(12.1) (12) (35.7)
Standby Letters of Credit (%) 31.8 31.3 47
(61.6) (60.6) (109)
Assets Securitized or 37.4 35.9 95.9
Sold with Recourse (%) (302) (296) (914)
Commercial Letters of Credit (%) 3.70 3.55 6.10
(22.1) (21.7) (44.3)
Amount of Recourse Exposure (%) 2.72 2.62 13.4
(14.9) (14.6) (162)
All other Off-Balance Sheet 9.33 8.97 157
Items (%) (72.6) (71.2) (8879)
No. of branches 9.07 8.91 13.41
(22.6) (22.3) (125)
Age of institution 28.5 28.3 71.7
(36.6) (36.25) (44.6)
Panel B: Number of Banks
No. of Banks 372 387 6580
% of TARP banks 3.2 3.1 11.1
Regulator Federal Reserve 44 45 641
All data on failed banks are from the quarter before a bank fails. Average values and
standard deviations are reported. Failed banks during the recession include banks that
failed and received government assistance from December 2007-December 2011. I also
include undercapitalized mergers, which are mergers with a bank having a Tier One ratio
of <0.04 at the time of the merger.
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Table 2.5: A: Probit analysis: TARP
Variables All Banks Less Well-Capitalized Well-Capitalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tier 1 Ratio -12.68∗∗∗ -6.59∗∗∗ -10.16∗∗∗ -3.84 -4.73∗∗∗ -1.41
(0.95) (1.14) (2.59) (2.89) (1.37) (1.72)
Troubled Assets Ratio -0.54∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ 0.27 -0.003
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.23) (0.27)
ROA -0.78∗∗ -2.13∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -3.12∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.88
(0.31) (0.40) (0.43) (0.51) (0.45) (0.64)
Real Estate Loans 0.74∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.14 -0.98
(0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22) (0.31)
Non-Performing Loans -0.39∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.22 -0.19
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18)
Standby Letters of Credit 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Assets Securitized or 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.005 0.004 0.006∗∗ 0.018∗∗
Sold with Recourse (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Commercial Letters of Credit 0.13∗∗ 0.04 0.28∗∗∗ 0.14 0.05 -0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13)
Amount of Recourse Exposure -0.003 -0.02 0.007 -0.01 -0.004 -0.03
(0.017) (0.02) (0.024) (0.03) (0.020) (0.04)
All other Off-Balance Sheet 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.007 -0.008 -0.01
Items (0.060) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.017) (0.02)
Constant -0.53∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.91∗∗∗ -0.31 -1.35 0.66∗
(0.15) (0.18) (0.26) (0.30) (0.25) (0.35)
Controls:
No. of branches 0.0005∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0113∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0045)
Age of institution -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0012)
Regulator Federal Reserve 0.0802 0.0787 0.0918
(0.0687) (0.0794) (0.1447)
Extra Small -1.24∗∗∗ -1.2730∗∗∗ -0.9275∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.1917) (0.2182)
Small -1.04∗∗∗ -0.9643∗∗∗ -0.8922∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.1122) (0.1812)
Medium -0.88∗∗∗ -0.7848∗∗∗ -0.8052∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.0901) (0.1661)
Large -0.51∗∗∗ -0.4814∗∗∗ -0.3328∗∗
(0.06) (0.0718) (0.1426)
Observations 6771 5256 3632 3148 3138 3138
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.17
Probit estimates corresponding to the entire TARP sample are reported. Extra small refers to banks with assets in Quarter 3, 2008 in
the lowest quintile (assets<=$51,687,000); small refers to banks with assets <=$100,271,000 and >$51,687,000; medium refers to banks
with assets <=$180,418,000 and >$100,271,000; large refers to banks with assets <=$389,741,000 and >$180,271,000. The top quintile,
or extra large group has assets <=$390,222,000
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Table 2.5: B: Probit analysis: TARP (excluding required 8)
Variables All Banks Less Well-Capitalized Well-Capitalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tier 1 Ratio -13.19∗∗∗ -7.14∗∗∗ -8.44∗∗∗ -2.78 -4.91∗∗∗ -1.88
(0.98) (1.18) (2.64) (2.93) (1.42) (1.77)
Troubled Assets Ratio -0.59∗∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗ 0.21 -0.02
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.27)
ROA -1.11∗∗∗ -2.39∗∗∗ -1.93∗∗∗ -3.55∗∗∗ -0.34 -0.97∗∗
(0.31) (0.41) (0.44) (0.53) (0.48) (0.64)
Real Estate Loans 0.95∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.40
(0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.25) (0.33)
Non-Performing Loans -0.50∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.29
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.19)
Standby Letters of Credit 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Assets Securitized or 0.004 0.005 -0.01 -0.01 0.006 0.017∗∗
Sold with Recourse (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.007)
Commercial Letters of Credit 0.14∗∗ 0.05 0.29∗∗∗ 0.15 0.006 -0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.130) (0.13)
Amount of Recourse Exposure -0.002 -0.02 0.001 -0.01 -0.005 -0.04
(0.023) (0.03) (0.025) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
All other Off-Balance Sheet 0.01 0.003 0.01 0.007 -0.007 -0.013
Items (0.01) (0.008) (0.01) (0.009) (0.017) (0.02)
Constant -0.60∗∗∗ -0.07 -1.07∗∗∗ -0.45 -1.56 -0.92
(0.15) (0.18) (0.26) (0.30) (0.27) (0.37)
Controls:
No. of branches 0.0004∗ 0.0003 0.0110∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0048)
Age of institution -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0012)
Regulator Federal Reserve 0.093 0.086 0.110
(0.069) (0.079) (0.145)
Extra Small -1.15∗∗∗ -1.25∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.19) (0.22)
Small -0.97∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.11) (0.19)
Medium -0.84∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.17)
Large -0.44∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.24
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14)
Observations 6748 5243 3617 3138 3131 2105
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.16
Probit estimates excluding the eight banks that were required to take TARP (and their subsidiaries) are reported. Extra small refers to
banks with assets in Quarter 3, 2008 in the lowest quintile (assets<=$51,664,000); small refers to banks with assets <=$99,883,000 and
>$51,664,000; medium refers to banks with assets <=$179,361,000 and >$99,883,000; large refers to banks with assets <=$386,889,000
and >$179,361,000. The top quintile, or extra large group has assets <=$386,889,000
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Table 2.5: C: TARP Probit Marginal Estimates
Variables All Banks Less Well-Capitalized Well-Capitalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tier 1 Ratio -1.790∗∗∗ -1.032∗∗∗ -2.266∗∗∗ -0.855 -0.352∗∗∗ -0.103
(0.122) (0.177) (0.576) (0.644) (0.098) (0.126)
Troubled Assets Ratio -0.076∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.0002
(0.015) (0.020) (0.029) (0.033) (0.017) (0.0198)
ROA -0.111∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.694∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.064∗∗
(0.044) (0.062) (0.094) (0.113) (0.034) (0.047)
Real Estate Loans 0.105∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.011 0.0072
(0.019) (0.027) (0.040) (0.047) (0.016) (0.0225)
Non-Performing Loans -0.056∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.016 -0.0139
(0.012) (0.016) (0.024) (0.027) (0.010) (0.0131)
Standby Letters of Credit 0.032∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.0024)
Assets Securitized or 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ 0.001 0.0009 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗
Sold with Recourse (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Commercial Letters of Credit 0.018∗∗ 0.006 0.063∗∗∗ 0.031 0.004 -0.0031
(0.009) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) (0.005) (0.0093)
Amount of Recourse Exposure -0.0004 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.0003 -0.0026
(0.0024) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.0029) (0.0011)
All other Off-Balance Sheet 0.0008 0.0007 0.002 (0.0016) -0.0006 -0.0010
Items (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.002) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Controls:
No. of branches 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0008∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)
Age of institution -0.0004 -0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Regulator Federal Reserve 0.013 0.0181 0.0072
(0.012) (0.0188) (0.0121)
Extra Small -0.105∗∗∗ -0.1514∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.0010) (0.007)
Small -0.106∗∗∗ -0.1451∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.0109) (0.008)
Medium -0.099∗∗∗ -0.1332∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.0116) (0.0073)
Large -0.067∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗∗ -0.0205∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.0124) (0.0076)
Observations 6769 6769 3632 3148 3138 3138
Marginal effects for the probit analysis are reported at the mean for the full TARP sample, probit estimates are reported in Table 2.5A.
Extra small refers to banks with assets in Quarter 3, 2008 in the lowest quintile (assets<=$51,687,000); small refers to banks with assets
<=$100,271,000 and >$51,687,000; medium refers to banks with assets <=$180,418,000 and >$100,271,000; large refers to banks with
assets <=$389,741,000 and >$180,271,000. The top quintile, or extra large group has assets <=$390,222,000
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Table 2.5: D: TARP Probit Marginal Estimates (excluding required 8)
Variables All Banks Less Well-Capitalized Well-Capitalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tier 1 Ratio -1.739∗∗∗ -1.069∗∗∗ -1.837∗∗∗ -0.608 -0.321∗∗∗ -0.133
(0.117) (0.174) (0.573) (0.641) (0.090) (0.126)
Troubled Assets Ratio -0.079∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.001
(0.015) (0.019) (0.029) (0.033) (0.015) (0.002)
ROA -0.147∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.420∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.068
(0.041) (0.061) (0.095) (0.114) (0.031) (0.046)
Real Estate Loans 0.126∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.028
(0.019) (0.027) (0.040) (0.047) (0.016) (0.023)
Non-Performing Loans -0.067∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.020
(0.011) (0.015) (0.024) (0.027) (0.010) (0.013)
Standby Letters of Credit 0.031∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Assets Securitized or 0.0005 0.0007 -0.002 -0.002 0.0004∗ 0.0001
Sold with Recourse (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Commercial Letters of Credit 0.018∗∗ 0.007 0.064∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.0004 -0.002
(0.008) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.0085) (0.009)
Amount of Recourse Exposure -0.0003 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.0003 -0.0026
(0.0026) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.0031)
All other Off-Balance Sheet 0.0007 0.0004 0.002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0009
Items (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Controls:
No. of branches 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001 0.0008∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Age of institution -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Regulator Federal Reserve 0.015∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.008
(0.011) (0.019) (0.012)
Extra Small -0.096∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Small -0.097∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
Medium -0.091∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
Large -0.056∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
Observations 6748 5423 3616 3616 3130 3130
Marginal effects for the probit analysis are reported at the mean for the TARP sample excluding the eight banks (and their subsidiaries)
from the sample. Probit estimates are reported in Table 2.5B. Extra small refers to banks with assets in Quarter 3, 2008 in the lowest
quintile (assets<=$51,664,000); small refers to banks with assets <=$99,883,000 and >$51,664,000; medium refers to banks with assets
<=$179,361,000 and >$99,883,000; large refers to banks with assets <=$386,889,000 and >$179,361,000. The top quintile, or extra large
group has assets <=$386,889,000
71
Table 2.6: A: Failed and Undercapitalized Banks Probit Analysis (2007-
2011)
Variables Bank Failures Bank Failures &
Undercapitalized Mergers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tier 1 Ratio -17.82∗∗∗ -25.18∗∗∗ -18.05∗∗∗ -25.60∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.62) (0.36) (0.61)
Troubled Assets Ratio 0.015∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
ROA -1.34∗∗∗ -1.78∗∗∗ -1.36∗∗∗ -1.74∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.13)
Real Estate Loans (%) 1.87∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10)
Non-Performing Loans (%) -0.29∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Standby Letters of Credit (%) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.027∗
(0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.014)
Assets Securitized or -0.017∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.019∗∗∗ -0.005
Sold with Recourse (%) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Commercial Letters of Credit 0.021 -0.068 0.011 -0.082
(0.003) (0.052) (0.034) (0.053)
Amount of Recourse Exposure -0.006 -0.035∗∗ -0.003 -0.029∗∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014)
All other Off-Balance Sheet -0.05∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
Items (0.01) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant -1.64∗∗∗ -2.64∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗ -2.54∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (0.20)
Controls:
Number of branches 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00001) (0.0001)
Age of institution -0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0096∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Regulator Federal Reserve 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)








Quarter Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 112759 86115 112735 86115
Pseudo R-squared 0.23 0.39 0.23 0.25
Probit estimates are reported.Extra small refers to banks with assets in Quarter 3, 2008 in the lowest
quintile (assets<=$51,687,000); small refers to banks with assets <=$100,271,000 and >$51,687,000;
medium refers to banks with assets <=$180,418,000 and >$100,271,000; large refers to banks
with assets <=$389,741,000 and >$180,271,000. The top quintile, or extra large group has assets
<=$390,222,000
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Table 2.6: B: Failed and Undercapitalized Banks Probit Marginal Esti-
mates
Variables Bank Failures Bank Failures &
Undercapitalized Mergers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tier 1 Ratio -0.1912∗∗∗ -0.0843∗∗∗ -0.5086∗∗∗ -0.0905∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0074) (0.0136) (0.0077)
Troubled Assets Ratio 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)∗∗
ROA -0.0370∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0006)
Real Estate Loans 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0520∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0007)
Non-Performing Loans -0.0080∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0083∗∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0002)
Standby Letters of Credit 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Assets Securitized or -0.0005 1e−5 -0.0005∗∗∗ 2e−5
Sold with Recourse (0.0001) (1e−5) (0.0001) (1e−5)
Commercial Letters of Credit 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0002)
Amount of Recourse Exposure -0.0002 -0.0001∗∗ -0.0007 -0.0001∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000)
All other Off-Balance Sheet -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗
Items (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Controls:
No. of branches 4e−7 5e−7
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Age of institution -3e−5∗∗∗ -3e−5∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Regulator Federal Reserve 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)








Quarter Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 112735 86115 112735 86115
Marginal effects for the probit analysis are reported at the mean. Extra small refers to banks with
assets in Quarter 3, 2008 in the lowest quintile (assets<=$51,687,000); small refers to banks with
assets <=$100,271,000 and >$51,687,000; medium refers to banks with assets <=$180,418,000 and
>$100,271,000; large refers to banks with assets <=$389,741,000 and >$180,271,000. The top quintile,
or extra large group has assets <=$390,222,000
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Table 2.7: Robustness Check: Cox Proportional Hazard Ra-
tios
Variables Gov’t Assistance Bank Failures &
Undercapitalized Mergers
Tier 1 Ratio 0.5689∗∗∗ 0.5704∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0117)




Real Estate Loans 1.0155∗∗ 1.0153∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0070)
Non-Performing Loans 0.9620∗∗∗ 0.9618∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0066)
Standby Letters of Credit 0.9917∗∗∗ 0.9917∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Assets Securitized or 1.0000 1.0000
Sold with Recourse (1e−5) ((1e−5)
Commercial Letters of Credit 1.0026 1.0022
(0.0026) (0.0027)
Amount of Recourse Exposure 0.9972 0.9970
(0.0030) (0.0031)
All other Off-Balance Sheet 0.9996 0.9996
Items (0.0007) (0.0007)
Controls:
No. branches 1.0018∗∗∗ 1.0018∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Age of institution 0.9827∗∗∗ 0.9824∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0021)
Regulator Federal Reserve 0.7453 0.7516
(0.1535) (0.1528)








Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 86115 86115
Extra small refers to banks with assets in Quarter 3, 2008 in the lowest quin-
tile (assets<=$51,687,000); small refers to banks with assets <=$100,271,000
and >$51,687,000; medium refers to banks with assets <=$180,418,000
and >$100,271,000; large refers to banks with assets <=$389,741,000 and
>$180,271,000. The top quintile, or extra large group has assets <=$390,222,000
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3 Appendix
Timeline of Key Events to the Financial Crisis
Represented below is a sample of key events that occurred by financial institutions,
the Federal Reserve and the U.S. government from the beginning of 2007 to 2009. A
more complete list with detailed descriptions can be found at the St. Louis Federal
Reserve Timeline of the Financial Crisis.
Table 3.1: Private Bank and U.S. Government Key Events, 2007-2009
Date Event
2007
February 27 Freddie Mac announces it will no longer buy the most risky subprime mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities
June 7 The FOMC maintains the federal funds target rate at 5.25%
July 24 Countrywide Financial warns of ”difficult conditions”
August 6 American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
August 7 The FOMC maintains the federal funds target rate at 5.25%
September 18 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 4.75%
October 10 U.S. Treasury announces the HOPE NOW initiative to provide counselor support to investors,
services, mortgage participants and homeowners
October 31 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 4.50%
December 11 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 4.25%
December 12 The Federal Reserve announces the creation of a Term Auction Facility (TAF) to auction
fixed amount of funds to depository institutions
2008
January 22 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 3.5%
January 30 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 3.0%
February 13 President Bush signs into law the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
March 7 The Federal Reserve Board announces $50 billion in TAF auctions this month and extends
the TAF for at least 6 months
March 11 The Federal Reserve Board announces the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) which
lends $200 billion of Treasury securities for 28-days against federal agency debt and MBS
March 18 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 2.25%
March 24 The NY Fed will finance $29 billion of JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns
April 30 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 2%
May 2 The Federal Reserve Board expands TAF auctions from $50 billion to $75 billion
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – Continued from previous page
Date Event
June 5 Bank of America’s offer to buy Countrywide Financial is approved by the Federal Reserve
Board
June 25 The FOMC maintains the federal funds target rate at 2%
July 13 The U.S. Treasury increases credit lines to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
July 30 President Bush signs into law the Housing and Recovery Act. This establishes a new Federal
Housing Finance Agency and the Treasury can also purchase GSE obligations
August 5 The FOMC maintains the federal funds target rate at 2%
September 7 The Federal Housing Finance Agency places Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservation-
ship. This allows the FHFA to take control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac while the
Treasury gets preferred stock.
September 15 Bank of America announces it will buy Merrill Lynch for $50 billion, gets approved in De-
cember; Lehman Brothers files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
September 16 The FOMC votes to maintain the federal funds target at 2%; The NY Fed lends $85 billion
to AIG
September 17 The U.S. Treasury announces a Supplementary Financing Program consisting of a series of
Treasury bill issues to provide cash for Federal Reserve initiatives; the SEC temporarily bans
short selling in financial company stocks
September 21 Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley restructure to become bank holding companies
September 25 Washington Mutual bank is closed, banking operations are bought by JP Morgan Chase
September 29 The FDIC announces Citigroup will purchase Wachovia backed by a FDIC $312 billion loss-
sharing arrangement with Citigroup. The U.S. House of Representatives rejects U.S. Treasury
legislation to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions
October 3 President Bush signs into law the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. This law estab-
lished the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP); Wells Fargo announces a
proposal to buy Wachovia without FDIC assistance, this is approved 9 days later
October 6 The Federal Reserve will start paying interest on required and excess reserves
October 7 The FDIC increases deposit insurance coverage to $250,000 per depositor
October 8 The NY Fed borrows $37.8 billion in securities from AIG in return for cash collateral;
The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 1.50%
October 14 U.S. Treasury announces that TARP will purchase $250 billion in capital in financial insti-
tutions under the authority of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
October 28 U.S. Treasury purchases the first $125 billion of preferred stock from 9 U.S. banks under the
Capital Purchase Program
October 29 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 1.00%
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – Continued from previous page
Date Event
November 10 The Federal Reserve Board approves American Express to become a bank holding company;
The U.S. Treasury will purchase $40 billion of AIG preferred shares under TARP while the
NY Fed will lend over $50 billion to AIG
November 20 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suspend mortgage foreclosures until January 2009
December 3 The SEC approves a measure to ensure fairer and more transparent credit ratings
December 16 The FOMC reduces the federal funds target rate to 0-0.25%
December 19 The U.S. Treasury loan General Motors $13.4 billion and Chrysler $4.0 billion from TARP
2009
January 5 The NY Fed begins purchasing MBS guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie
Mae
January 16 The U.S. Treasury and FDIC enter into a loan-loss sharing arrangement with Bank of America
on $118 billion in loans and securities; Citigroup is guaranteed $306 billion through a similar
mechanism
February 17 President Obama signs into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This
act increases government spending and tax cuts
February 18 The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan is created to refinance home mortgages
owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that are 80% of underlying home
value; U.S. Treasury takes preferred stock of $200 billion in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
February 23 The U.S. Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS and the Federal Reserve Board issue a statement that
the U.S. government stands behind the banking system. They also promise enough capital
and liquidity
February 25 The U.S. Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS and the Federal Reserve Board announce “stress tests”
on U.S. bank-holding companies with assets over $100 billion
March 2 The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board announce they will restructure AIG
March 3 The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board launch the Term Asset-Backed Securities
Loan Facility (TALF). TALF lends up to $200 billion to owners of AAA-rated asset-backed
securities backed by auto loans, credit loans, student loans and small business loans
March 18 The FOMC maintains the federal funds target rate of 0-0.25%
March 19 The U.S. Treasury announces a new program to provide $5 billion to the auto industry;
IndyMac Federal bank sale by the FDIC is complete. They had total assets of $23.5 billion,
loss to FDIC of $10.7 billion
May 20 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 is signed which raises FDIC deposit insurance
guarantees to $250,000 per depositor
June 26 The U.S. Treasury announces that banks under CPP can repurchase warrants following a
multi-step process to determine fair market value
Note: This table contains only major events related to TARP. Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve.
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October 14, 2008 Treasury Press Release on the CPP
Washington - Treasury today announced a voluntary Capital Purchase Program to
encourage U.S. financial institutions to build capital to increase the flow of financing
to U.S. businesses and consumers and to support the U.S. economy.
Under the program, Treasury will purchase up to $250 billion of senior preferred
shares on standardized terms as described in the program’s term sheet. The program
will be available to qualifying U.S. controlled banks, savings associations, and certain
bank and savings and loan holding companies engaged only in financial activities
that elect to participate before 5:00 pm (EDT) on November 14, 2008. Treasury will
determine eligibility and allocations for interested parties after consultation with the
appropriate federal banking agency.
The minimum subscription amount available to a participating institution is 1
percent of risk-weighted assets. The maximum subscription amount is the lesser of
$25 billion or 3 percent of risk-weighted assets. Treasury will fund the senior preferred
shares purchased under the program by year-end 2008. Institutions interested in
participating in the program should contact their primary federal regulator for specific
enrollment details.
The senior preferred shares will qualify as Tier 1 capital and will rank senior to
common stock and pari passu, which is at an equal level in the capital structure,
with existing preferred shares, other than preferred shares which by their terms rank
junior to any other existing preferred shares. The senior preferred shares will pay
a cumulative dividend rate of 5 percent per annum for the first five years and will
reset to a rate of 9 percent per annum after year five. The senior preferred shares
will be non-voting, other than class voting rights on matters that could adversely
affect the shares. The senior preferred shares will be callable at par after three
years. Prior to the end of three years, the senior preferred may be redeemed with
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the proceeds from a qualifying equity offering of any Tier 1 perpetual preferred or
common stock. Treasury may also transfer the senior preferred shares to a third party
at any time. In conjunction with the purchase of senior preferred shares, Treasury
will receive warrants to purchase common stock with an aggregate market price equal
to 15 percent of the senior preferred investment. The exercise price on the warrants
will be the market price of the participating institution’s common stock at the time
of issuance, calculated on a 20-trading day trailing average.
Companies participating in the program must adopt the Treasury Department’s
standards for executive compensation and corporate governance, for the period during
which Treasury holds equity issued under this program. These standards generally
apply to the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, plus the next three most
highly compensated executive officers.
The financial institution must meet certain standards, including: (1) ensuring
that incentive compensation for senior executives does not encourage unnecessary
and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution; (2) required
clawback of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive based
on statements of earnings, gains or other criteria that are later proven to be materi-
ally inaccurate; (3) prohibition on the financial institution from making any golden
parachute payment to a senior executive based on the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vision; and (4) agreement not to deduct for tax purposes executive compensation in
excess of $500,000 for each senior executive. Treasury has issued interim final rules
for these executive compensation standards.
Nine large financial institutions already have agreed to participate in this pro-
gram, moving quickly and collectively to signal the importance of the program for
the system. These healthy institutions have voluntarily agreed to participate on the




Given that my data is a time series from 2007 to 2013, the estimates in Equation
(1.1) may be subject to autocorrelation. In order to test whether the model follows
an autoregressive order of lag 1 (AR 1) I test whether εt = ρ · εt−1 + µt such that the
current value of residuals are related to last period’s residuals and a random error.







where residuals are saved from estimating Equation (1.1). The null hypothesis is
that there is no first-order autocorrelation. Estimating the Durbin-Watson d statistic
which equals 2(1 − ρ̂) determines whether we reject the null or not. When calcu-
lating the distribution of the d-statistic, empirical upper and lower bounds must be
established. For a test of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation versus the alter-
native hypothesis that there is autocorrelation of AR(1), the lower bound of the DW
d-statistic is 1.758 and the upper bound is 1.779 with one regressor (excluding the
intercept) and over 200 observations at the 5% level.
If the d statistic is less then the lower bound of the DW d statistic we reject the
null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation. If the DW d statistic is above the
upper bound of the DW d statistic we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is
no autocorrelation. If the DW d statistic is between the upper and lower bounds the
test is inconclusive. The DW d statistic calculated from estimating Equation (1.1)
is 1.716 which is slightly below the lower bound. The Durbin Watson test indicates
that we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation.
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Additionally, I examine whether the error terms follow a white noise process using
the Ljung-Box test. This test relies on regressors being a realization from a white-
noise process. The null hypothesis is that the data is independently distributed and
the alternative hypothesis is that the data is not independently distributed. The test
statistic is given by:






where m is the number of autocorrelations calculated, in my model m = 1 and n is
the given times series length. ρ̂ is the estimated autocorrelation of the series at a lag
of j. The degrees of freedom is equal to h = m − p − q taken from the ARMA(p,q)
model. Assuming a lag of 1, p=1, and q=0. Therefore, h=0.
If the Q statistic that is estimated is greater than a chi-square distribution at a
given significance level than the null hypothesis is rejected. Such that:
Q > χ21−α,h (3.3)
At a 5% significance level the chi-square distribution reveals an upper statistic of
3.841 and a lower bound of 0.004. Since my estimated Q statistic is 27, I reject the
null hypothesis that the data is independently distributed.
Correcting for Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity
The Newey West method devised by Newey and West (1987) suggest that only impor-
tant covariates should be estimated, rather than an estimation of all the covariances
of possible correlated terms over time. This simplication suggests that observations
are more correlated with each other as they get closer together. So, the first step in
estimating Newey-West standard errors is choosing a lag, l=1, for my data, which is
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the standard lag period when using stock prices. Testing the Durbin-Watson statis-
tic or Ljung-Box test statistic can also verify the lag term. Therefore the estimated












Using this correction will yield the same coefficients, but more accurate standard er-
rors as OLS estimation. However, tests on autocorrelation and white noise indicate
that I should correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. These issues are cor-
rected using the Newey West method in my tables.
Data Construction
CRSP uses the bid-ask midpoint price that is closer to the close price at 4p.m when
reporting data. When CRSP uses this bid-ask midpoint, it represents the stock price
as a negative price in the data. I correct for that using absolute value. An alternate
source for daily stock data is Compustat, which reports the trade based closing price
for the day. Compustat has accessible data until 2007 on WRDS, so I compared the
CRSP stock prices with the Compustat stock prices prior to 2007 and find that the
differences in reporting data is small and negligible. This should not be an issue,
because CRSP data is consistently used for all stock price data.
Further, there are a few days where there are missing price data for some tickers.
This occurs in CRSP, Compustat and also cross-checking on a third-site, Yahoo. For
example, if ticker OVBC is missing stock price data on June 11, 2008 it will be rep-
resented by . in the CRSP. This is due to stock splits, mergers, no trades that day or
a stop put in by the SEC. Instead of dropping the entire bank from my sample, I just
record the previous day price in the missing blank. Since I examine daily returns,
82
this means that there will be no price change from one day to the next and the return




The following tables use the CRSP-value weighted index rather than the S&P
500. Comparing cumulative abnormal returns in Appendix Table 3.2 to Table 1.2
and market model results in Appendix Table 3.3A-C and Table 1.3A-C yields similar
results. Results using other market indices such as the NYSE 100 Composite In-
dex, NASDAQ and Dow Jones Industrial Average are not reported, but yield similar
results. They are available upon request.
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Table 3.2: Abnormal Returns During Three TARP Events
(1) (2)
Banks N Newey-West Newey-West+FF
A. Announcement
TARP 219 0.0851∗∗∗ 0.0574∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0089)
Non-TARP 219 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0082)
Required 8 8 0.1118∗∗∗ 0.1009∗∗
(0.0378) (0.0378)
Large TARP 74 0.1477∗∗∗ 0.0977∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0155)
Large Non-TARP 37 0.1113∗∗∗ 0.0723∗∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0187)
Mid-Size TARP 65 0.0826∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗
(0.0164) (0.0155)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 62 0.0717∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0144)
Small TARP 72 0.0201 0.0147
(0.0144) (0.0145)
Small Non-TARP 120 -0.0107 -0.0163
(0.0109) (0.0107)
B. Infusion
TARP 219 -0.0387∗∗∗ -0.0254∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0083)
Non-TARP 219 -0.0220∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0069)
Required 8 8 -0.1190∗∗ -0.0805∗
(0.0369) (0.0389)
Large TARP 74 -0.0337∗∗∗ -0.0081
(0.0090) (0.0095)
Large Non-TARP 37 -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0436∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0147)
Mid-Size TARP 65 -0.0346∗∗ -0.0285∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0138)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 62 -0.0334∗∗ -0.0312∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0121)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – Continued from previous page
Banks N Newey-West Newey-West+FF
Small TARP 72 -0.0386∗ -0.0341∗
(0.0189) (0.0191)
Small Non-TARP 120 -0.0091 -0.0080
(0.0096) (0.0098)
C. Capital Repayment
TARP 186 0.0176∗ 0.0191∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0089)
Non-TARP 212 -0.0008 0.0004
(0.0052) (0.0051)
Required 8 8 0.0197 0.0254
(0.0157) (0.0186)
Large TARP 70 0.0054 0.0079
(0.0057) (0.0057)
Large Non-TARP 36 0.0060 0.0064
(0.0085) (0.0071)
Mid-Size TARP 50 0.0113 0.0145∗
(0.0077) (0.0076)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 61 0.0011 0.0035
(0.0087) (0.0089)
Small TARP 58 0.0374 0.0355
(0.0269) (0.0270)
Small Non-TARP 115 -0.0039 -0.0030
(0.0079) (0.0079)






surrounding the three TARP-CPP events: announcement, capital infusion
and capital repayment are reported. Cumulative abnormal returns are
calculated
∑N
i=1 ARit, where AR = Rit − E(Rit). Expected returns for each
bank are estimated over a 250 day pre-event window. Standard errors
are parentheses. The cumulative average abnormal return for the
[-2, +2] event window is reported. The CRSP value-weighted index is used























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Capital Asset Pricing Model
Similar to Elyasiani et. al (2014), I use a market model as my main specification.
However, it has been suggested to consider the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as
a specification. In the market model, investors are risk averse and choose a portfolio
to minimize the variance of the return and maximize expected return (Fama and
French 2004). Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) add two assumptions to the market
model which include: investors agree on the joint distribution of asset returns and
investors all borrow and lend at the risk-free rate.
The capital asset pricing model is:
E(Rit) : R̂it = Rf + β̂i(E(Rmt)−Rf ) (3.5)
where,
E(Rit) = The expected return of asset i
Rf = The risk free rate of return
E(Rmt) = The expected return of the market portfolio
αi = The model’s intercept (a measure of risk-adjusted daily performance)
βi = cov(Ri, Rm)/var(Rm)
Compared to the Capital-Asset Pricing model (CAPM), the market model allows
the intercept to vary across assets. CAPM places a parameter restriction of alpha,
such that αi=(1 − βi)Rf . Another criticism of CAPM is that empirical results over
the last fifty years show that the assumption of unrestricted risk-free borrowing and
lending is unrealistic. However, the interpretation of the market model and CAPM
are similar; the CAPM beta measures the systematic or nondiversifiable risk. In the
90
CAPM model, alpha can be interpreted as the excess return above the risk-free rate
that an investor receives. Below cumulative average abnormal returns and CAPM
results are estimated first using the S&P 500 (in Tables 3.4, 3.5A-C), then using the
CRSP-value weighted index (in Tables 3.6, 3.7A-C) as the market index. The choice
of which market index to use has little effect on the parameter estimates.
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Table 3.4: CAPM Abnormal Returns During Three TARP Events
(1) (2)
Banks N Newey-West Newey-West+FF
A. Announcement
TARP 219 0.0914∗∗∗ 0.0660∗∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0087)
Non-TARP 219 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0080)
Required 8 8 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0371)
Large TARP 74 0.1383∗∗∗ 0.0933∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0157)
Large Non-TARP 37 0.1089∗∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0183)
Mid-Size TARP 65 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0153)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 62 0.0788∗∗∗ 0.0526∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0140)
Small TARP 72 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0368
(0.0145) (0.0145)
Small Non-TARP 120 0.0098 0.0035
(0.0110) (0.0107)
B. Infusion
TARP 219 -0.0304∗∗∗ -0.0151∗
(0.0082) (0.0083)
Non-TARP 219 -0.0093 -0.0076
(0.0070) (0.0070)
Required 8 8 -0.1235∗∗ -0.0814∗
(0.0374) (0.0395)
Large TARP 74 -0.0426∗∗∗ -0.0122
(0.0088) (0.0094)
Large Non-TARP 37 -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0151)
Mid-Size TARP 65 -0.0230∗∗ -0.0179∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0136)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 62 -0.0267∗∗ -0.0249∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0124)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – Continued from previous page
Banks N Newey-West Newey-West+FF
Small TARP 72 -0.0140 -0.0082∗
(0.0189) (0.0192)
Small Non-TARP 120 0.0110 0.0122
(0.0095) (0.0097)
C. Capital Repayment
TARP 186 0.0160∗ 0.0186∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0090)
Non-TARP 212 -0.0005 0.0005
(0.0053) (0.0055)
Required 8 8 -0.0002 0.0139
(0.0131) (0.0172)
Large TARP 70 0.0033 0.0074
(0.0056) (0.0055)
Large Non-TARP 36 0.0002 -0.0027
(0.0113) (0.0129)
Mid-Size TARP 50 0.0107 0.0149∗
(0.0078) (0.0076)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 61 0.0009 0.0042
(0.0088) (0.0090)
Small TARP 58 0.0380 0.0361
(0.0268) (0.0272)
Small Non-TARP 115 -0.0016 -0.0057
(0.0080) (0.0080)






surrounding the three TARP-CPP events: announcement, capital infusion
and capital repayment are reported. Cumulative abnormal returns are
calculated
∑N
i=1 ARit, where AR = Rit − E(Rit). Expected returns for each
bank are estimated over a 250 day pre-event window. Standard errors
are parentheses. The cumulative average abnormal return for the [-2, +2]
event window is reported. The S&P 500 is used for market returns.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: CAPM Abnormal Returns During Three TARP Events
(1) (2)
Banks N Newey-West Newey-West+FF
A. Announcement
TARP 219 0.0858∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0087)
Non-TARP 219 0.0420∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0080)
Required 8 8 0.0859∗∗∗ 0.0860∗∗
(0.0368) (0.0367)
Large TARP 74 0.1299∗∗∗ 0.0896∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0158)
Large Non-TARP 37 0.1013∗∗∗ 0.0688∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0183)
Mid-Size TARP 65 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0153)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 62 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0493∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0141)
Small TARP 72 0.0398∗∗∗ 0.0349
(0.0145) (0.0145)
Small Non-TARP 120 0.0077 0.0021
(0.0109) (0.0107)
B. Infusion
TARP 219 -0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0158∗
(0.0082) (0.0083)
Non-TARP 219 -0.0108 -0.0083
(0.0070) (0.0070)
Required 8 8 -0.1385∗∗ -0.0920∗
(0.0389) (0.0410)
Large TARP 74 -0.0443∗∗∗ -0.0117
(0.0087) (0.0094)
Large Non-TARP 37 -0.0479∗∗∗ -0.0431∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0151)
Mid-Size TARP 65 -0.0257∗∗ -0.0184∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0136)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 62 -0.0290∗∗ -0.0259∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0124)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 – Continued from previous page
Banks N Newey-West Newey-West+FF
Small TARP 72 -0.0146 -0.0090∗
(0.0189) (0.0192)
Small Non-TARP 120 0.0110 0.0116
(0.0095) (0.0096)
C. Capital Repayment
TARP 186 0.0170∗ 0.0194∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0090)
Non-TARP 212 0.0006 0.0020
(0.0052) (0.0052)
Required 8 8 0.0106 0.0220
(0.0142) (0.0181)
Large TARP 70 0.0039 0.0082
(0.0057) (0.0057)
Large Non-TARP 36 0.0062 0.0068
(0.0087) (0.0072)
Mid-Size TARP 50 0.0117 0.0152∗
(0.0078) (0.0077)
Mid-Size Non-TARP 61 0.0015 0.0042
(0.0088) (0.0090)
Small TARP 58 0.0382 0.0364
(0.0269) (0.0271)
Small Non-TARP 115 -0.0017 -0.0008
(0.0080) (0.0080)






surrounding the three TARP-CPP events: announcement, capital infusion
and capital repayment are reported. Cumulative abnormal returns are
calculated
∑N
i=1 ARit, where AR = Rit − E(Rit). Expected returns for each
bank are estimated over a 250 day pre-event window. Standard errors
are parentheses. The cumulative average abnormal return for the
[-2, +2] event window is reported. The CRSP value-weighted index is used




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Pooling of loans together to form a security to sell to investors for a claim against
the cash flows of that asset is called securitization. Securitization is not new to
banking, but the usage of securitization of asset-backed securities in the market has
exploded in recent years. Gorton and Metrick (2011) provide extensive background
on securitization that I believe is useful here. Since the 1990s, pools of loans were
sold in capital markets held together by legal entities called special purpose vehicles.
These asset-backed securities are not only within the mortgage market, but more
commonly have used credit card receivables and automobile loans.
Special purpose vehicles are a separate, legal entity under business trust law.
SPVs or trusts are businesses in which no one actually works there. A bank decides
that it does not want to hold some loans on their balance sheet and decides to sell
them to a SPV. These mortgages, credit card receivables or loans are then bundled
up and issued by the SPV with a credit rating into different tranches, based on their
inherent perceived risk. These tranches can then be sold to investors. As Gorton
and Metrick (2011) point out, a trust just executes orders, but does not make any
managerial decisions. The bank gets a lump-sum payment for selling the mortgages,
while investors get the promise of future cash flows.
Gorton and Metrick (2011) further detail the special features that SPVs receive.
i. SPVs are tax neutral meaning that they are not subject to income tax at the
trust level, but they also do not get the tax advantage of having more on-balance
sheet debt.
ii. SPVs cannot go bankrupt. Instead, if they cannot contractually pay the cash
flows each month from asset-backed securities they go into an early amortization
event. This means that they pay down principal with any available funds they have,
so long funds are available.
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iii. SPVs are bankruptcy remote from the sponsor bank. The contractual agree-
ment between an SPV and an investor states that the trustee and rating agency
ensure asset-backed securities meet qualifications for it be securitized, not the bank.
Due to these three features, SPVs are an attractive mechanism for which banks
can sell securities. However, asset-backed securities are also an attractive investment
for investors as there is no ability to produce private information about the payoffs of
the security, so the monitoring costs are low. Further, there is no active management
that can alter the risk of the investment (Schwarz 2003). The contractual cash flows
then are what investors should expect to receive.
Why do Banks Choose to Securitize Assets Off-Balance
Sheet?
Numerous competing hypotheses concerning risk-taking behavior of off-balance sheet
items have been discussed in older literature around the time when securitization
really began. Hassan (1991) offers two hypotheses: the diversification hypothesis and
the leverage hypothesis. The diversification hypothesis states that there is a negative
relationship between total bank risk and off-balance sheet items, while the leverage
hypothesis states that there is a positive relationship between total bank risk and
off-balance sheet items. The former hypothesis suggests that banks engage in selling
information services and warehousing assets which induces them to put some items on
and off the balance sheet. A bank chooses to use off-balance sheet items to enhance
its credit and accommodate the needs of customers. The latter hypothesis states
that fixed rate deposit insurance provides incentives for banks to obtain financial
leverage through off-balance sheet items that are not subject to capital requirements.
Therefore, riskier assets are more likely to be found on the off-balance sheet.
Similarly, Nachane and Ghosh (2002) offer two opposing theories for the reason
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banks choose to engage in a large number of off-balance sheet activities. First, a
bank securitizes safe assets off the balance sheet and the risky assets on the balance
sheet due to a pooling problem. Second, the hedging and tax hypothesis states that
derivatives represented as an off-balance sheet item can increase the value of the firm
via bank fees and increase the probability that the banks pre-tax income is in the
progressive region of the tax schedule.
More recent literature agrees with the positive relationship or leverage hypothe-
sis between off-balance sheet items and risk. Notably, Thiemann (2011) believes that
there are three dimensions for why banks choose to use off-balance sheet items: credit
transformation, maturity transformation and liquidity transformation. They involve
transforming low quality credit into high quality credit via securitization, financing
long term assets with short term liabilities and creating liquid assets from what would
have been an illiquid asset on the balance sheet. Jin et. al (2011) indicates that risky
loans increase a banks probability of failing, so in order to look strong in the market
a bank is better off putting these loans as off-balance sheet items.
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Variable names
Table 3.8: Variable Definitions
Name Definition
Tier one capital Common shareholder equity and disclosed reserves or retained earnings
that accrue to the shareholders’ benefit
Loans past due 90 days or more If the principal or interest on an asset is past due by 90 days or more,
but at least 90 days of interest payments have been capitalized,
refinanced or delayed by agreements
Nonaccrual loans If the principal or interest on an asset becomes due and is unpaid for 90
days or more, then it is placed in nonaccrual status until it meets criteria
to be restored to accrual status. Generally, a nonaccrual asset will be
restored to accrual when its principal and interest are paid, the banks
expects repayment of contractual principal and interest or when it
becomes secured and in the process of collection
Other real estate owned Real property held for reasons other than to conduct bank business.
Banks usually acquire ORE through foreclosure after a borrower defaults
on a loan secured by real estate
Loan loss reserve The allowance for loan and lease losses based on the credit risk within
the institution’s assets. This reserve reduces the book value of a
bank’s loans and leases to the amount an institution expects to receive
Real estate loans Real estate loans include loans that each reporting bank characterizes as
such
Return on assets (ROA) Indicates how profitable a company is relative to total assets
Standby letters of credit An irrevocable commitment by the issuing bank to make a payment to
a designated beneficiary. It obligates the bank to guarantee or stand as
surety for the benefit of the third party
Commercial letter of credit A commitment to facilitate trade or commerce and represent contingent
liabilities
Assets securitized or sold with recourse Assets that are sold by a bank and control is surrendered on the asset.
Control is transfered if there is legal isolation of the financial assets
from the seller, the ability of the investor to pledge or sell the assets,
or the absence of a right to repurchase the financial assets. In order to
be moved to the off-balance sheet, an asset transfer must occur. Assets
sold with recourse means that a bank transfer assets in a sale, but
retains an obligation to repurchase the assets or absorb losses due to
default in payment or deficiency in performance
Continued on next page
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Table 3.8 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition
All other off-balance sheet items This includes contracts on other commodities and equities, all other
off-balance sheet liabilities, participation in acceptances conveyed and
acquired securities borrowed, securities lent, commitments to purchase
and sell when-issued securities
Note: Variable definitions from FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve and Call Reports.
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Table 3.9: Failed Banks Probit Marginal Estimates
(Individual Year 2009, 2010, 2011)
Variables 2009 2010
(1) (2)
Tier 1 Ratio -0.1574∗∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0046)




Real Estate Loans 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0001)
Non-Performing Loans -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0005)
Standby Letters of Credit 0.0003∗∗∗ 3e−5∗
(0.0001) (0.00001)
Assets Securitized or 5e−6 1e−7
Sold with Recourse (2e−5) (0.00000)
Commercial Letters of Credit -0.0011∗ -4e−6
(0.0006) (5e−5)
Amount of Recourse Exposure -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0006)
All other Off-Balance Sheet -0.0001∗ -9e−7
Items (0.0000) (0.00000)
Controls:
No. of branches 1e−8 4e−8
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Age of institution 3e−5 1e−6∗∗∗
(1e−5) (0.0000)
Regulator Federal Reserve 0.0005 5e−5
(0.0003) (0.0002)








Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 20767 112735
Extra small refers to banks with assets in Quarter 3, 2008 in the low-
est quintile (assets<=$51,687,000); small refers to banks with assets
<=$100,271,000 and >$51,687,000; medium refers to banks with assets
<=$180,418,000 and >$100,271,000; large refers to banks with assets
<=$389,741,000 and >$180,271,000. The top quintile, or extra large
group has assets <=$390,222,000. There were 121 banks that failed in
2009 and 102 failures in 2010 with government assistance.
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